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' ' "' I, - INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This document on the-'state and trends of economic and social 
development in Latin America is largely based'1 on the special studies and 
reports prepared by the :CEPAL' Secretariat for the appraisal of the 
International Development Strategy (IDS) and on-tl̂ at appraisal-itself, 
the draft of which was prepared by the Committee of;,High Level Government 
Experts (CEGAN, Quito, March''12-16 1979) 'and adopted'as the "fourth regional 
appraisal by the Commission: at its eighteenth session (La Paz, Bolivia9 
April 18-26 1979) under the title of the La Paz Appraisal.*/ On all these 
occasions, the governments of the region made-a' careful5 detailed study Of 
thè structures and trends of'Làt-in;American economic and social development; 
the conclusions at tfhich they arrived, a're worth reproducing here as an 
introduction to this document, since they constitute a sytithesis of their 
analysis of the problem. '-' - • •'• 
With regard1 to réceht economib and social, development in the countries 
of the region in relation'tò; trends and pro ject-ions, the following observations 
were made which may be saldato summarize the more: detailed analysis that 
follows:' "'•'• '•' - •'• ' •" "•'- '•' • • ' r<-•'•-!• . 
"«,.. despite the efforts madê'by7 the developing countries of! the-région 
towards the ob jectives' set òiit in thé-International Development Strategy for 
the Second United Nations Development Decade and the shaping of a-New 
International Economic Order, these have not been sufficient to boost the 
development of the developing countriés due, inter alia, to the obstacles 
deriving from-the policiéè and measures imposed by the industrialized 
countriés and the acceleration of the remittance of profits outside the 
region and other negative practices óf the transnational enterprises, with 
*/ "La Paz Appraisal", CEP AL, May 1979.» Other important, reference 
sources were the three earlier appraisals and various resolutions 
adopted at that session, particularly resolution 386 (XVIII),-
"Preparations and contributions by CEP AL for the. formulation, of the 
New International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade". Finally,- mention-toust be made of thé main 
document prepared by the CEP.AL Secretariat entitled. The Economic and 
Social Development and External Economic Relations of Latin America, 
vols. I and II, E/CEPAL/1061, 31 January 1979, 
/the result 
the result that Latin American development is ©till facirig serious problems 
and obstacles of a structural nature at the national level and above all 
at the regional and international levels, the,manifestations of which 
include'the following! • . .••. 
(a) the rate of economic growth has declined considerably since,the 
middle of the present decade, and a large number of countries in the region 
have continued to achieve; unsatisfactory and extremely slow, progress. 
Agricultural output, despite technological progress and diversification, 
has continued to. follow the-historical trend-, and industrial output has 
suffered an appreciable;, decline in. vigpur • in recent years •• • This evolution 
is clearly ,at odds, with the; region's ..potential for economic growth,, in view 
of its natural .resource endowment,, the abundant availability of labour and. 
the capacity to promote' an .adequate process of investment and to carry on 
private and public management; of the, economy,̂  despite, the problems,, and 
obstacles of an internal and external nature suffered by.the developing . 
countries of-.Latin America,, .including, the restrictive, practices of the - .. 
transnational enterprises and problems of a,structural character. It is 
therefore necessary to envisage solutions, within the. formulation of the 
third International Development Strategy, for the problems created by the.,.., . 
application of * strategies = unsui ted to the characteristics of,, the region; 
. (b) the region, cpptinues to show. indications of substantial economic. 
and social backwardness. ; in. many - aspects and features, which-characterize this 
stage in its•development: ineffectiveness • in promoting ,the full productive 
employment .of humais resources; a very high, concentration of. ownership of , 
property, income distribution and consumption; increasing foreign debt; 
situations of intolerable extreme poverty and. indigence; marked heterogeneity 
in the. .systems of production, which, is reflected in the economic and. 
technological backwardness prevailing in the productive activities of a ... 
large proportion of the labour force and also in the low level of integration 
of the national economies; insufficient development of industrial production 
of fundamental categories of basic and capital goods needed to'stimulate 
economic development, unbalanced: external trade, with primary commodities 
taking- up a large;,share of exports, while imports are largely composed of 
,. .• * ' /industrial products 
industrial' products and capital goods essential for the growth process; and 
low levels of doméstic saving and considerable dependence on external 
investment and financing, which help, along with other factors, to limit 
the self-determination that national development policies should enjoy; 
(c) the far-reaching social changes which have accompanied the 
prevailing process of economic growth in the region have helped to shape 
societies which are unjust and highly polarized, with increasing social 
differentiation and extremely unequal distribution of the benefits of growth 
(d) the decline in the economic growth rate is largely attributable 
to the recession and fluctuations in the world economy, and in particular 
to the course followed by the situatión of the industrial countries, on 
which Latin America is still highly dependent. Thèse'unfavourable economic 
developments have heightened the gravity of the social problems mentioned 
above; ••'.•• : 
(e) despite some promising advances in economic co-operation and -
mutual trade among Latin American countries, several économie integration 
agreements are ëncoun'tering serious'difficulties, and the objectives arid 
targets laid down have not been achieved. In addition, the efforts of the 
developing countries tò implement the agreèments adopted at the Mexico 
City Conference Òri Economic Cò-opératióh ariiohg Developing Countriés òn 
ECDC have not received sufficient support ffroiin the industrialized Countries, 
particularly in UNTCTÂD arid UNDP ; " ; i ' 1 ' ' 
(f) serious'difficulties arë being encountered'in achieving the 
necessary degree of expansion arid diversification of exports of: primary 
commodities arid semi-manufactured and manufactured products. The obstacles 
which hamper and limit access to the markets of thé developed countries are 
increasing "as a result Of thé proliferation of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, including measures'which have come back and worsened the climate 
of protectionism now dominating international-economic policy. To this ' 
must be added the wórséhing and instability of the térms of trade-, the 
burden of foreign indebtedness, the deterioration in the terms of financing 
and the fluctuations and uncertainty in the currency and exchange-markets, 
which adversely affect thé interests of the developing countries ; "•" 
'/(g) the 
(g) the industrial redeployment assistance measures in the developed 
countries which are used to maintain, inefficient industries adversely 
affect the interests of the developing countries, while the agreements 
on the restructuring of .industry, in the developed countries, which affect 
the developing countries, have so. far been reached in forums in which 
the latter countries do not participate; v 
(h) in practice,., concepts have been, followed which are not accepted 
by the international community and are contrary to the efforts to establish 
a New. International Economic. Order, such, as grading, selectivity and 
access to supplies; ... .,,... 
(i) international commodity, markets, including the. commodity exchanges, 
are frequently monopolized by the ,transnational ..corporations, in favour of 
their.own interests, . . ,.,.. . . 
The international situation described above is preventing the Latin 
American countries from fully mobilizing their potential resources and 
carrying through appropriate economic policies to achieve the efficient 
allocation of their resources and -.promote dynamic growth in productivity 
and income; It is therefore urgently .necessary.,for trhe countries of the 
region.,to intensify their national development .efforts and, for the same 
purpose co-ordinate vigorous action on.the b$sis of regional and 
international sqli^fr^ty -to tackle.the problems,indicated for the benefit 
of all the countries alike. To this end, it is essential to promote the ' 
formulation,and application of a regional plan of action for the forthcoming 
decade, which should be linked.with the preparation and application of 
the New International Development, Strategy as. far as the countries of 
•Latin America are concerned.''*/ 
.The grounds for this appraisal of the economic, and social, development 
of-the region are briefly indicated in the following chapters, with 
reference to their economic, demographic and social aspects in relation 
to the development pf. education. *&/ This Differentiation nevertheless 
*/•' 'v. CEPAL Resolution. 386 (XVIII), 26, April , 1979. ; 
**/ The concept of educational development is. used very broadly here, 
and includes formal and informal education as well as' other forms 
'of training outside the family. 
/respects the 
respects the concept of integral' development repeatedly-¡proclaimed' in 
j?esolutions of ithë Unitëd? Nation's General-Assembly ând CEPAL as its 
l̂ egional organ; The La Paz appraisal contain® an: even briefer overall 
summary: "The decade about 'to end has been a ¡period Of major fluctuations 
and contrasts'* with rapid e'Oonomic growth at thé' start and a distinct 
falling "off towards the end. In the long-terrf,' despite the significant 
average economic "growth of the last -three decades, there. ;has been a 
persistent lack 'of adjusttiient betîiéëïi the growth-of the economy and the. 
developmeirt of society. VÏ. This may- bé 'seen-particularly in such aspects 
-as the concentration of income, the-polarization of consumption, the 
uiiderutilization of the ̂ abour;iforce,' and situations of poverty" (see 
paragraphs 9 and 11), , .• • 
The main thrust of the;'arialysis inv. the present document is precisely 
concerned with this gàp>between economic growth "and- social development, 
which will also'Constitute the focal point for estimating the effect 
o f those pr^œs^'s -on tfoe deAtelĉ  • . v • -
II. GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY 
•'..'•;;• •': l. - Main; "features'of lbngrterro%'-econc»nig trends 
This' section contains a summary of the salient features of regional 
economic development. 
All through the last three decades, Latin America "as a whole has 
gone through a dynamic process of economic development which may be 
considered quite significant. The gross domestic product has grown at 
an average rate of 5.4% per year, which is faster than the other- developing 
areas (except for the oil-producing countries), and even higher than 
the rate for the industrialized market-economy countries as a whole, although 
it is considerably less than the dynamism achieved by the socialist countries 
and Japan. 
This'economic growth has been accompanied by a relatively intensive 
process of investment and modernization in the productive arid technological 
aspects of the economy. The industrial facilities of the region have been 
/considerably expanded 
considerably expanded and diversified, .thus making it possible to satisfy; 
from domestic production almost the entirê  demand for. .consumer goodsas 
well -as-an increasing- part of that,for basic intermediate and capital goods, 
and -to promote - above all-during the; present decade - the begihning of a 
growing process of diversification of exports through the incorporation of 
manufactured products'.. At the same .time, agriculture-has: been changing r. 
with the introduction of modern production techniques and advances in- î? 
organization and in the marketing of agricultural'products. There has: also 
been, a considerable expansion ;of. the:, infrastructure ¿especially that • - • ; 
connected with transport, communications and energy:.' Thus,-, the national 
economies have tended to increase-their degree .of integration and .sectoral 
interdependence. Mi. : " ' 
- ': The region as a- whole has achieved an > average per cap it as product of 
about.1,300 dollars at current prices and is at a: roughly ..intermediate 
position in the world scale, displaying what might,.be called an intermediate 
degree of semi-industrialization or>economic semi-development. This• . * . 
appraisal is not, of course, equally true for every one of the countries 
of the region. .' • 
This picture of the evolution of the Latin American economy in the 
world context changes considerably ;,- however j if one takes into account the 
rate of population increase in â-tin America, which is cleanly, higher 
than the rates in other regions of the world. Thus, the average annual 
rate, of increase of the per capita gross domestic product was 2.6%, so 
that in absolute figures the product, has .doubled, but this has taken 
28 years,. and the growth has been lower than that recorded by the great 
majority of the industrialized countries, except forthe United States, 
so that the income gap which existed in comparison with these countries 
2.8 years ago has grown still wider. Moreover, the gap with the socialist 
countries and Japan is. even greater. 
The economic growth rate has shown marked differences between 
countries, or groups of countries in Latin America, although the process has 
been relatively dynamic,for the majority of them, (See table 1.) Considerable 
changes have taken place in the economic and demographic importance of the 
/Table 1 
Table! • - . ' 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF TÖIAL GRÖSS DOMESTIC :PROTUCT ' -
(Average annual growth rates', ] percentages) • • ••••'• ' 
1950- 1950- 1960- 1965- 1970» 1974- 1970-
1978 1960 " 1970 '•' 1974 f- 1974 1978 1978 
Countries of largest -
economic size . f 
Argentina 3.2 3.0 4.3 4.7 5.1 -0.8 2.1 
Brazil ' 7.2 ' 6-.B •'•"•' 6»i 9-6 • 12.2 ' ~ 6.1 '9.1 
Mexico 6.0 •" 5.8 7.0 - 6.5 . 6.0 3P6 - 4.9 
Oil exporting countries ••• - * > i 
Bolivia 3.7 0.4 5.5 6.0 5.6 5.8 5.7 
Ecuador '" 5.8 ' '4.9 '5.3 •'•' 6.6 ' 8.3 6.8 7.6 
Venezuela 6.5 . -, 7.6 6.0 . 4.7 ,. 4.7 , 6.8 5.8 
Member countries of CACM 
Costa Rica 6.1 6.2 60I 7.0 7.0 4,8 5.9 
El Salvador 5.1 '''4.7" .,. • 5.6 - • '4.9' 5.4 4.8 5.1 
Guatemala .. • 5.1 - , '. - 3.S . 5.5 - • .- 6.1 ,-. .6.5 • . 5.7" 6.1 
Honduras 4.4 3.8 
• 3.9 3.6 5.5, 4.6 Nicaragua 5.9 5°3" ""•' 6.9 ' 5.0 6.4 2.3 '4.4 
Medium-sized countries . \ 
Colombia 5o2. •-.,; 4.6 • 5.2 : 6.3 . • 6.9- . . 4.9 5.9 
Chile 3.5 3.9 4.5 3.2 2.3 1.4 1.8 
Peru ' 4.8 ••5.3 5.4 "5.0 ''" • 6»o 1.1 3.5 
Other South American 
.countries- , .' ," , -
Paraguay 4.6 2.4 4.6 5.2 • 8.4 7.4 Uruguay 1.7 •2.1 1.6 1.2 -Ool 3.3 1.6 
Other Latin American " 
countries .. J: - • •' r , - -1. 
Haiti 2.0 O06 3.1 4»7 , >1 , . 3.9 
Panama " 5.5 4.6 7.8"' ' 6.5 5.5 '"' 1.8 " 3.6 
Dominican Republic • : 5.9 .;• 5.7. .. ... 5.1- . "f 8.7 . 10.0 4.3 • 7.1 
English-speaking ; - • 
Caribbean countries 
Barbados ee o 0 ee '5.9 : 3.6 : -0.2 -2o0a/ -0.1b/ 
Guyana OS« ee© 3.2 4.2 2.2 . 0=2a/ '. -1.8b/ 
Jamaica 5.3c/ 9.0 . 5.5 4.7 2.9 ... " 1/ Trinidad and Tobago oe e 000 ' 4.4 3.0 2.3 3.8a/ 2.9b/ 
Total 5.4 5.1 '-1 5.? ' 6.7 -7.5 4.0 5.7 
Source» CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics, 
a/ Refers to period 19711-1977. 
b/ Refers to period 1970-1977» 
c/ Refers ta period 1950-1977« 
/countries at 
countries at the regional level. Thus, the countries of the Southern Cone 
of Latin America (comprising Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), which had a 
relatively high level of per capita, income- and had been pioneers in 
• industrialization, registered .smaller overall economic growth and have 
seen their share of the regional product and population go down appreciably. 
Another feature of this long-term evolution is that.the differences , 
between large, medium-sized and small countries as regards degree and 
potential of economic, technological and financial development have become 
more pronounced. Among other aspects, the differences are to be seen in 
the economic and demographic size of the countries, their degree, of 
industrialization, the technological advances achieved and the structure 
of their external economic and financial relations. 
. The rate and structure of economic development have not' been uniform 
over the .last three decades. There have been profound changes, influenced 
especially by the national strategies and policies adopted by governments, 
the evolution of the world economy and trade, and the new forms of external 
relations of the countries of the region. In a first period* up to the 
middle of the last decade, the growth of the region as a whole was 
relatively moderate, being promoted, above all in the large countries and', 
some of the medium-sized ones, by substitution industrialization. Exports 
grew very slowly, the terms of trade deteriorated, and there was a persistent 
decline in the coefficient of imports with respect to the domestic product. 
In a second stage, however, which extended from the middle of the last 
decade until the period 1973-1374, the growth rate accelerated considerably, 
external demand increased, the real valye of exports, grew, and there was 
greater availability of external financing. In these circumstances, 
imports grew considerably, at a faster rate than the domestic product. 
The final stage - the present - began with the world recession which 
followed the rise in oil prices and affected most of the countries of 
the region from 1974 onwards. The main economic events and trends in the 
1970s will be considered in greater detail below. 
/There'have-' 
There have been promising quantitative and qualitative advances 
as regards mutual economic relations between Latin American- countries. 
There has also been an,increase in the relative importance of exports to 
the socialist countries, and to a much smaller extent in the region's flow 
of exports to other developing countries. The most noteworthy development, 
however, has been Latin America's growing internationalization and closer 
links in the economic and financial field with the system of the central 
capitalist economies since the end of the last decade. The external 
relations of the region have become much more complex and diversified, 
an outstanding role being played in this by the transnational enterprises. 
This experience of the interrelations between the internal and external 
factors of economic growth shows the high degree of dependence or sensitivity 
of the growth rate "of the countries of the region with respect to international 
conditions and particularly the economic evolution of the industrialized 
countries. 
2. Economic growth in the past decade >V 
Since 1970 the region's annual cumulative economic- growth' has . 
amounted to 7.5%,. which in isolation may be considered a satisfactory 
performance. However, the .population growth rate remained relatively 
high 02.7% on average) .and thus the per capita product grew by 2,8% 
annually, which is a much more modest figure. These overall indicators ' 
conceal the sharp differences in the relative situation, and economic 
performance of the countries of the region. Almost half the countries-
failed to attain an annual growth rate of 4,5% in their domestic product, 
and thus the growth of their per capita product was also below.the 
'above-mentioned figure. On the whole, it may be said that during' the 
present decade the differences among the countries as regards economic 
and demographic- importance have grown sharper. 
*/ For this and the next section, see "The Global Objectives of the 
Latin American Development Strategy and the Programme of, Work of 
CEPAL in relation to the New IDS for the forthcoming Decade", 
E/CEPAL/L.133, 15 June'1.979. 
- : ' • /The average - ' 
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The average growth of regional agricultural output has remained 
relatively low, despite the progress made in modernization and in the 
.diversification of crops. Output levels in 1978 represented an average 
annual growth rate of a little under 3.5% in relation to 1970. Here 
again there were clear differences among countries, the majority of which 
failed to reach the 4% annual growth target. 
The overall growth rate of the industrial sector also fluctuated, 
although more sharply. The 1978 output levels represent an annual growth 
of only slightly over 6% in relation to 1970. In most countries growth 
was definitely sluggish in this stage of Latin American development. Only 
three countries reached or exceeded the 8% target for the growth of 
industrial output. All this had a negative effect on job creation in the 
manufacturing sector, and thus contributed to the fact that the overall 
rates of unemployment and underemployment remained very high. 
The heterogeneity of production which has characterized Latin 
American industrialization doe's..not appear .t̂ ' haye.-: declined significantly 
in the 1970s. The incorporation of modern.technology is limited in extent, 
with the result that the coexistence of industrial:firms, with,very v 
different levels of productivity is.maintained, if not -increased, . This 
heterogeneity., in the urban areas has been combined, in the present decade, 
with an increasing differentiation of. .productivity in rural areas, ,where 
the spread.-of ..modern agrobusiness. in a slowly-changing rural economy has 
increased the., differences. in productivity. among the different forms of 
production,, with easily.imaginable consequences for distribution, particularly 
as concerns smallholders and rural labourers. 
The performance of the world economy and particularly of the industrial 
coxantri.es with which Latin America carries, on., most of its external trade 
had a major effect on the rise and fall in the economic growth rate of 
the Latin American countries. 
The following, stages can be. distinguished in the economic performance 
of the present decide:'- • • < -' ' • 
(a) Between 1970 and 1973 economic growth accelerated and the 
region as a whole attained an annual average rate of roughly 7.4%. Major 
/growth factors 
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growth factors included national policies directly aimed at promoting 
economic development, and active external,demands stemming from the boom 
in the central economies until .1973¿ better terms of trade and a greater 
supply of ¿xternal;.financing; 
(b) In 1974 the Latin American and, .world, economic picture changed 
dramatically. The oil-exporting countries benefited from.a further rise,, 
in prices which helped to raise their real income and their external . 
purchasing power. On the other hand, the non-oil-exporting countries 
faced weak external demand due to the¡recession in the industrial countries 
and worse terms of trade. Since they continued to increase their imports, . 
with the growth of the <product and domestic;, investment, they built up large • 
deficits on the balancfe-of-payments current account, which had to be 
covered with external financing and the use: of.their foreign currency 
reserves; - ..,•• ". 
(c) In 1975,. external conditions• worseneds leading to a significant-, 
fall in external purchasing power, and despite the drop in imports the 
balance-of-payments current-account deficit again- increased, while the 
growth of the product dropped to a mere 3%, very nearly the same-as the 
population growth rate. " .-•::..- -.-. 
3. New modes of insertion in the internetibnal economy • 
During the present, decade, Latin America's modes of insertion in the 
world economy have changed radically. The most notable fact has been the 
growing internationalization and closer economic and financial linkage 
with the system of the central economies. It is interesting, in this 
respect, to note the markedly parallel nature of the growth of Latin America 
and that of the industrial countries as a whole over the past eight years, 
although the rates for Latin America have been somewhat higher. 
The following basic features of Latin America's new form of insertion 
may be mentioned: 
(a) The structure of Latin America's exports has altered significantly 
In the first place, exports of manufactured goods have in recent years 
risen to 20% of total exports, although this increase has not been uniform 
/and has 
12 
and has mainly been ..concentrated in the big countries and fsome of the 
medium-sized countries* Secondly, a distinct diversification of exports 
of primary commodities has occurred at the national :level, which in some 
degree has mitigated the effects that fluctuations in world prices used to 
have oh one-commodity exporting countries„ These changes • illustrate patterns 
in the economic development process with important ulterior effects, and 
also show the efforts of the Latin American countries to deal with their 
structural external disequilibrium. . 
(b) The region has considerably increased its external indebtedness. 
The'debt, which was US$ 10 billion in;.. 1965, today stands'at close on 
US$ 100 billion. This quantitative change has been •accompanied by a change 
in the origin of this capital, v. In the/1950s,. the. bulk of. the capital 
<entering-Latin America was.:of official origin and. mostly of a long-term 
nature, only a small part coming from private sources. Today the proportions 
... .are reversed. Four-fifths is of banking and commercial origin, and moreover 
.the.majority are short- and medium-term loans, which have altered the debt 
¡profile and appreciably increased the.percentages of the value of exports 
represented by debt servicing. » . " < .< 
(c) Transnational corporations have played an; important role .in the 
increasing internationalization of.the Latin American,,economies. It is 
estimated that in 1975 the cumulative investment of the OECD countries in 
"Latin America was close to US$"4o billion and that the sales'of transnational 
corporations represented some US$ 80 billion, which is nearly double the 
total value of"Latin American exports in that year. At the same'time, the 
use of external loans has very largely been channelled through transnational 
corporations, which have thus obtained greater safeguards of good returns 
on their investment'. 
It should also be"noted that although the new patterns of Latin America's 
insertion in the world economy have, among other positive aspects, permitted 
the region to have access to increased financing in time of crisis and to 
promote export flows of manufactures, they have carried the region to high 
levels of indebtedness and to considerable dependence ¡both on international 
private banks and on transnational' corporations 
A . Final 
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Final., considerations 
; The review óf the economic and social development of Latin America1 
in the present decade, somë of the"main feàturés of which have been 
briefly described in the foregoing pages, gives rise to the following 
reflections. i ' 
Firstly, the region showed that it has an effèctive growth capacity 
Which enabled it to grow at an average rate-of 7.4% during the period 
1970-1974, Thè experience of this period showed that when favourable . 
external conditions existÌ the region is capable of making an intensive 
domestic effort of accumulation5and saving and thus arriving at high growth 
rates. When it is borne in mind that during: the period considered an ' 
important group of-countries grëw at low rates, it Is safe to assert that the 
region 'has a considerable growth potential. 
Secondly, this period showéd'the marked sënsltivity of the economic 
growth raté of the Latin American countries with-réspect to thé- course of 
the world economy, and particularly the growth rate'of the industrial 
countries. At the satire tirile* the countries. showéd urieqùal capacities for--
facing up to adverse éxtërhal factors. In the circumstances, there is an 
evident lack of -finânciàl machinery to dear adequately with situations 
created by unfavourable èxtèrnal factors which many countries cannot control, 
'such"as the adverse effects of the recession or of the international economic 
conjuncture, '-1 .- ' 
<"••'• Thirdly, it has been shown that thé region needs active trade with 
the developed countries in order to maintain high rates of growth, since 
Latin America continues to depend on the industrial countries for supplies 
of capital goods and some basic inputs, which are essential items for 
making headway-with the process of the transformation, of production and 
particularly the industrialization plans within the current styles of 
development. Access under satisfactory conditions to the markets of the 
developed countries in order to facilitate the growth of exports of primary 
products, semimanufactures and manufactures is an essential requirement 
for speeding up growth. Regional co-operation and the growth of reciprocal 
trade, of course, constitute another essential condition for achieving the. 
./development objectives 
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development objectives to which Latin America, should aspire. But this 
should not and cannot be considered.as.a substitute for the first of these 
factors. Both strategies.must be conceived of as complementary objectives, 
especially over the period of the next decade, ; _ 
Fourthly, many countries of the region are reaching the end of the . 
present.decade with high levels of external indebtedness, and the servicing 
of these debts accounts for high percentages of the value of their exports. 
This situation gives rise totwo implications with important ulterior ,. 
consequences. In some cases it will be difficult to increase this 
indebtedness beyond certain, limits in keeping with the evolution of domestic 
product and exports. Generally speaking,'increasing the real value of , 
exports becomes more and more imperative owing to ¿the need to attend "to.. 
the financial servicing of the debt accumulated, as a result of,the growing 
dependence on imports and external financing» i • U, ... 
Lastly i the .prevailing;; economic development 'process continues to 
reveal a limited capacity for-.generating employment and making a fair 
distribution of the fruits ,of growth. . Thig.,.-wiil bepome.worse ap-,a.result . 
of the growth already being noted in;the economically active population. 
In the circumstances it. is .evident'that if the .eeonoraic.., growth'^ate is not 
boosted.'and adequate.policies of/,redistribution adopted, present- social-
problems-will, .tend to persist, with higher unemployment .and ¡underemployment, 
fewer and worse basic social services (education, health, infrastructure» 
housing, etc.> and a rise in-the already.'considerable social inequalities«? 
• . : ;,"III. POPULATION- TRENDS AND CHANGES */ ., „-::• 
• 1. Diagnosis of the present-demographic situation ,. •-,-:•. 
Latin America as a whole has the highest demographic growth rate in " 
the world (2.7% in 1970-1975), although with considerable differences7 
among countries (see tables 5 ánd 6). ' Between 1950 and 1975 the population 
of the region rose from 163 to 322 million,; or roughly double, while the • 
*J In addition to the general references indicated at the beginning of 
this document the present chapter also draws on the report by César 
Peláez, Tendencias y,perspectivas demográficas, CELADE, November, 1978 
/world population 
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world population grew by less than 60% and the population of the more 
developed regions by barely over 30%. Thus its share of the world 
population rose slightly from 6.6% in 1950 to 8.3% in 1975 (see table 3). 
This rapid growth is already showing signs of falling off. The 
region's global fertility rate,V 5.3. between .1970 and.1975, was markedly 
lower than that of other developed regions such as Africa and South Asia 
(6.3 and-6.9, respectively) but was nevertheless more than double the 
rate of the more developed regions (see table 2). 
The information available on population growth trends indicates that 
the rate of growth of the population reached its peak in the,middle of 
the 1960s and now is beginning to decline slowly. Nevertheless,, it is 
expected to remain high until the end of this century, and certainly above 
the average growth rate of the world population. According to the most 
recent projections, the population growth rate is expected to fall to 2.4% 
by the end of this century, which would produce an increase of about 90% 
of the population existing in 1975 (see table 4). 
In about 1975, life expectancy at birth was nearly 62 yearsa well 
above the figures for Africa and South Asia (45 and 48 years respectively), 
but 10 less than the figures for North America and Europe. The overall 
decline in mortality means that a group of 15 countries have a life 
expectancy .of. more than 60 years (yiith a fe ;̂ approaching 70,), while in a 
few countries life extfectancy is still barely over 50 yeMrs (see table 2). 
The high fertility in 1970 meant that the age structure of the 
region's population was predominantly young, although, with, major variations 
between countries according to their degree of demographic transition as 
will be seen below. On average, young people aged less than 15 years 
represented 42% of the total population in 1975 and are expected to decline 
to less than 38% in the year 2000, amounting to 227 million persons. By the 
year 2000 the number of children and young people in this age group is 
jV The general fertility rate is represented by the average number of 
children which a woman would have had at the end of her fertile life 
if during that period, in other words between the ages of 15 and 50, 
she had reproduced according to the annual average fertility rates by 
age of the population of a country in a given period. 
/Table 11 
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" V . Table 2 -. "... 
LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER WORLD REGIONS» SELECTED 












World total' • "'' • ' • ' 57.2 • • 4J2 . 19.3 
More developed regions 7i'.7 'r 2,5 • • e„o 
Less developed regions ' • 54.6 5.0 - ' 23.6 
Africa ,f 47.3 6.3 • 27.7 
Latin America 63.7 5.0 27.0 
North America' - 71»7 2.0 8.0 • 
Bast Asia - 64«:4 3.2 ' 15.6 : 
Sooth Asia SLA 5.8 : 26ol 
Europe 2.2 ' ••••i • 5.5' 
Oceania • 66.B • K: . .3.4 ' ; " :16.1 :' 
USSR • • • ' ' i ! - 70.9 ;< i . 2.4 • '< 
Source» Latin America» CELADE, Boletin Demografico, Vol. Vin, Nfl 15» January"1975, 
. ... and Vol. XI,. JJe 22, July 1978. The data relate to, 20 countries with over . 
97$ of the region's total population.. 
World total and rest of the regions» Selected World Demo graphic Indicators 
,,, by Countries, 1950-2000,(ESA/P/WP.55. 28 May 1975). 
/Table 11 
- 17 -
labi è . 3 
WORLD POPULATION BY REGIONS 
(Thousands) 
W50-1978 
Region 1950 1955 •I960-, - 1965 - 1970 1975 1978 
World total 2 500 931 2 722 226 2 985 836 ' 3 288 186* 3 610 036 3 966 125 4 203 269 
More developed regions 857 305 914 733 975 656 1 056 246 1 083 886 1 131 361 1 160 598 
Less developed regions 1 643 626 1 80? 493 2 010 179 2 251 940 2 526 lio 2 834 764 3 042-671 
Africa 218 803 243 315 272 795 5Ö8 787 351 727 401 314 436 080 
Latin America 163 643 187 527 215 434 247 392 282 679 322 353 349 080 
North America Ì66 073 181 741 198 662 2Í4 040 226 389 236 841 243 965 
East Asia 674 821 728 914 787 980 854 378 926 866 1 006 380 1 054 435 
South Asia 692 916 762 815 855 711 970 157 1 101 199 1 249 793 1 353 197 
Europe 391 968 407 616 425 154 444 990 459 085 473 098 481 119 
Oceania 12 632 14 139 15 771 17 507 19 323 21 308 22 » 7 
USSR 180 075 196 159 214 329 230 936 242 768 255 038 262 806 
Source« World Population Prospects as Assessed,in 1973, ST/SSA/SEfLA/60, United Nationst New YorkiV 1978. . 
The data for Latin America were obtained from,CELADE, Boletín Denmgrát'ico, Vol. XX,'KB 22, op. cit. 
Both .the world totel and data for the "more developed" and "léss ^eveioped" regions are baséd on 
figures taken from this Boletín (ÜQ 22). Argentina, Uruguay and Chile are included among the 
countries of the "more developed" regions. Eve figures for 1978 were obtained interpolation 




WORLD POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1975-2000 
(Thousands) v « v: ? 
Region 1975 1978 • 1980 .... 1985 .1 1990 . W ? 5 2000 
World total "3 966 125 4 203- 269" 4 370 617- 4.811-080 5 272 370 5 752.451 6.241 913 
More developed regions ,1 131 361 1 160 598 1 180 532 í 230 088 1 276 662 1 319 037 'i 359 411 
Less developed regions. 2 834 764 ,3 042. 671 3 190 085 3 580 992 3 995 708 4 433 414 882 502 
Africa . , 401 314 436 080 460 915 531 701 614 (»5 708 453 813 681 
LatinAaerica 322 353 349 080 . 368 138 420 177 477 938 540 491 607 464 
NorthAmerica 236 841 ,243 965 248 833 262 344 275 136 286 163 296 199 
East Asia . 1 006 380 , 1 054 435 1 087 749 1 164 848 1 233 498 1 301 942 1 370 Ó6l 
South Asia 1 249 793 1 353 197 1 4 2 6 843 1 624 722 1 836 258 2 053 610 2 267 266 
Europe ; 473 098 481 119 486 541 499 972 513 605 526 755 539 500 
Oceania - 21 308 22 587 23 482 25 777 28 109 30 431 32 715 
USSR 255 038 262 806 268 115 281 540 293 742 304 607 315 027 
Source» World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1973, ST/B5A/SER.A'/6Ó, tinit'EFR Nations", New York, 1978» 
. The data for Utin America ware obtained from CELADE, Boletín 'Peteg^ioó'^rifcxr^-iB' 22yopo cit. 
Both the itorld total, and data- for the "more developed" arid "less' ¿¿veto^ed" Regions are based on 
figures taken from this Boletín (NS 22). Argentina, Uruguay ¿id Chile are included among thé countries 
of the "more developed" regions« The figures for 1978 were obtained by interpolation between those for 
1975 arid 198Ó. " ..„••> 
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Table 5 
USXN AMERICAt TOTAL P0PU1AT3DK OP THE REGION BY OOUmRHS, 1950-1978 
( B a g s g g i f l s ? . 
Country 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970 1975 1978 Density 2 per to 
Argentina 17 150 18 928 20 611 22 179 23 748 25 384 26 395 9.5 
Bolivia 2 703 2 973 3 325 3 761 4 282 4 888 5 285 4.8 
Brazil 52 901 61 864 71 539 82 541 95 204 109 730 119 477 14.1 
Colombia 597 13.446 15 755.. , 18 485 . a 261 23 838 25 6l4r 22.5 
Costa Rica 858 1 024 1 236 1 482 1 732 1 965 2 111 41.5 
Cuba " -5 858 6 426 7 029- 7 808 :;,"8 572 9 332 9 718 87.6 
Chile 6 091 6 743 7 585 8 510 9 368 10 196 10 732 14.2 
Ecuador 3 307 3 812 4 422 5 134 < 5 958 6 891 7 543 29.0 
El Salvador ' V I 940 2 218 2 574 3 005 '3 582 4 143 4 524 2Ì6.1 
Guatemala :2 962 3 423 3 966 ... 4 615 V 5 » 3 6 243 6 839 62.8 
Haiti 3 097 3 376 , 3 723 > > 4 137 4 605 5 157 5 534 200.0 
Honduras • • .1 401 1 644 1 943 " 2 304 v . 2 639 3 093 3 439 30.7 
Mexico • 26 606 30 949 36 369 i r'- 42 859 50 313 59 204 65 421 - ' 33.3: 
Nicaragua 1 109 1'278 1 472 1 701 970 2 318 2 559 a . 6 
Panama : V 825 - 94? 1 095: 1 269 1 464 1 678 1 808 23.9 
Paraguay . .1 371 1 564 1 774 2 016 301 2 647 2 888 7:1 
Peru - > 7 832 8:864 10 162 11 721 ;>• 13 504 15 485 16 s a 13.1 
Dominican Republic 2 361 2.747 3 258 - 3 854 . 4 523 5 229 5 653 116.7' 
Uruguay ' .2 194 2 353 2 531 - 2 693 824 2 842 2 886 15.4 
Venezuela 145 6110 7 632. • 9 119 V ' -10 709 12 666 13 989 15.6 
Total 20 countries "157 308 180 689 207 999 239 193 ?12 312 92<} 539 236 
• ' 
Barbados 211 227 233 235 • - 239 249 577.7 
Guyana 423 486 560 648 709 791 846 3.9, 
Jamaica 1 403 1 542 1 629 1 760 1 882 2 0 0 2 115 192.9 
Suriname 215 250 290 332 371 422 461 2.8Ì 
Trinidad and Tobago 632 721 843 908 955 1 009 1 041 203.0 
Other countries I 451 3 612 880 4 316 i 611 4 928 5 132 
Total for the region 163 643. 187 52? a s 434 247 392 •''282 679 322 353 349 080 
Source» CELADE, Boletin Denografico, Vol. XI, MS 22, op. cit. 
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• '*"'' '' " Table 6" '" ' ' ' ' i:> ' ' 
« / . . . • 
LATIN AMERICA (20 COUNTRIES)« TOTAL GROWTH RAIB"" ,'• 1950-1975 AND RELATIVE GROWTH 
Country 1950-1955 
•y 
1955-1960- ••1960-1965 - 1965-1970 1970-1975 





Latin America O • • : . 
(,20 countries) 1 .:. 
1 27.67 28.10 27'.9Ó; :sS 27.07 
¡ \ > 
26.59 98.9 
Argentina - ' 19.66 . 17.01 • 14*65 13.66 13.32 48.0 
Bolivia 19*02 22.39 ' 24.57 25.93 26.45 80.8 
Brazil - 31.17 • 29.01 28.56 ; 28.50 28.3*; •". 107.4 
Colombia 29.52 31.60, 31-94 • 27.93 22.86. 105.6 
Costa Rica 35.20 37.55 ' ,. 36.24 » 31.08 T.:! : '25.1a-' , 129.0 
Cuba 18.48 17.92 21.02 r 3.8.65 16.98 v 59.3 
Chile 20.33 ' 23.50: 22.97 - .< 19.19 , I6.94 67.4 
Ecuador 28.38 '.'. 29.60;/ •29.82. -OÍ 29.71 29.04 • 108.4 
El Salvador 26.76 ..<;• 29.74-' ; 30¿86 - 35.01 . . ; ! 29.02 : 113.6 
Guatemala 28.86 29.36;/- ;. .30.30 29.60 ¡ i? 30.69 110.8 
Haiti 17.25 v s 19-52 21ill 21.39 22.63 . 66.5 
Honduras 31.76 ( 33.28; J " 33.98 '•fíj ¡27.12 31.69 120.8 
Mexico 30.18 32.21 1 32.77 32.00 V > • 32.47 122.5 : ' 
Nicaragua 28.36 . 28.18,; . <,; 28,93 29.28 : '¿ 32.49 . 109.0 
Panama 2?.64 ;„ 28.9? •' i-.f ä29i30 v¿* 28.66 27.16-. 103.4 
Paraguay 26.32 ^ 25.17^ 25.55 26.39 .. . . . 27.96,, . 93.1 
Peru •v.. ¿4;?4 J'. ̂ 27.28''* ' '¿S.27 •'• - 27.32 " ~ 97.7 
Dominican Republic 30.24 33.99 33o 51 a.98 28.95,, 121.5 
Uruguay : 13.97 14.55 35.42 9.48 1.3Ö 29,5 
Venezuela 34.26 44.15 35 o 50 32.06 » 33.43 ! 146.2 
Barbados r. 8.9O 9.00 3.90 • 3.30 5.00" 16.1 
Guyana ,.. 27.80 28.40 24.50 22.80 21.70 87.0 
Jamaica 18.90 11.00 15.50 13.40 15.00 44.6 
Suriname 30.20 29.70 27.20 22.00 25.70 • • 96.3^ 
Trinidad and Tobago . r 26.40 31.30 14.90' • 10.10 . 10.90 59.7^ • 
Sources CELADE, Boletín Demográfico, 
af Per thousand. 





expected to grow by 80 million, many of whom will enter the educational 
system. School-age children (6 to 12 years) will number nearly 65. million 
by the end of the century. 
The.rapid growth of the population has led to much higher density,, 
2 
rising from 8 inhabitants,per km in 1950 to 16 in 1975. The figures 
are of course much lower than those for Asia and Europe. Variations within 
the region are considerable: in 1975 population density..ranged from under 
4 to 568 inhabitants per km (Guyana-and Barbados, respectively). In-
most of the countries, including those with the largest surface.area, > 2 
average density was under 30 inhabitants per km , with high concentration 
in a few heavily populated areas and limited population in the rest of 
the country (see table 5). • 
As a general rule, and despite the increase in average density the 
pattern of concentrated distribution of the population has.not changed . 
substantially since_1950, when the region already showed high levels of 
urban concentration and rural dispersion. This is clearly visible in the 
urbanization process Which is much more advanced and intense than in other 
less developed regions of the world. The urban population which stood 
at : 41% in 1950 (54 millio'h persons) will rise to over 64% in 1980 (236 
million), absorbing'roughly 82% of total population growth in the region 
during that period. In the majority of the countries, including the most 
heavily populated ones with the exception'of Argentina, the rate of growth 
of the urban population was 5% annually or more, which would imply that 
the urban population would double in less than 15 years. However, this 
growth rate of the urban population is already beginning to show declining 
trends which should become stronger in the future, except in a fete countries 
in which urbanization remains limited, where the growth rate will probably 
remain very high. ' 
The concentration of thé population in large metropolitan areas 
(over,one million inhabitants) has increased significantly-, and theste areas 
accounted for more than 22% of the region's total population in 1975, 
as opposed to.barely 9% inl§50. This intense process of metropolization 
is all the more evident when it is remembered that the proportion of the 
urban population inhabiting major metropolitan areas rose from 23% to 
40% between 1950 and 1978. /The rural 
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The rural population has grown much more slowly and with clearly 
falling trends since 1950» The average annual growth rate was 1.1% 
between 1950 and 1978, while the urban population grew at rates over 
5% annually. Thus very slowly a change is taking place in the considerable 
dispersion which characterizes the rural population of the region, with 
a few exceptions. 
The economically active population (EAP) has grown increasingly 
rapidly, rising from 55 million persons in 1950 to about 108 million in •"• • 
1978, ixei ,-practically doubling during the period. It is expected that a 
similar trend will take place to the end of the century, since much.of . 
the EAP in the year 2000 has already been born. Internal trends include 
greater participation of women and less of young people and the aged, in 
the first case as a result of the wider coverage of the educational system, 
and in the second because old people are less adtive due-to the broader 
protection they receive from social security services. 
2. Prospects of demographic change 
The above description of the prospects of the demographic change in 
the region as a whole.should, be followed up by an analysis, of the probable 
variants of those trends in different countries or groups of countries 
which possess clearly differentiated demographic, economic and ,social 
features:*/ (i) countries at an advanced stage of demographic transition 
(Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba); (ii) countries in which fertility 
has begun to decline over the last 20 years (Costa Rica» Colombia, Brasil, 
Venezuela and Panama), and (iii) the remaining .countries, in which there 
was no.sign of a significant decline infertility in 1970. Broadly speaking, 
this classification tendto correspond with indices, of.economic and 
social development, with a few clear exceptions such as Peru and Mexico, 
which belong to the third group of countries although their level of. 
development places them among countries of the other groups. 
V See CEPAL..Long-term trends and projections of Latin American economic 
development, E/CEPAL/1027, 3 March 1977. 
/Bearing in 
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. Bearing in mind the above considerationss it is important to identify 
the outlook for demographic change in the. countries of the different 
groups. In those of the first group, fertility is comparatively low, 
although there is still an appreciable margin for. it to decline in the 
less privileged social sectors and classes. Life expectancy in these 
countries is among the highest in the region; the mortality rate will 
decline slowly or rise, in the cases of Argentina, Uruguay and probably 
Cuba, due to the relative aging of the population. As a consequence of 
these trends the population will, continue to grow increasingly slowly in 
these countries. The projected trends ,in fertility and mortality mean 
that the age structure of the population will continue towage, The 
proportion of persons aged less than 15 years will continue to decline, 
the proportion of persons of active age will remain at the present high 
levels or even increase in some countries, and the proportion of persons 
aged over 65 years will continue to rise. These countries, have already 
attained high levels of urbanization, a.nd it may be expected that this 
process will continue increasingly slowly. The same will be true of the 
growth of the rural population, which will be increasingly slow,, and will 
probably decline in absolute terms in. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
In the countries of the second.;group, consisting of Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, fertility began to decline more 
recently than in the first group. Broadly speaking, the downwards trend 
should become, stronger and probably its effect on•the growth rate of the 
population will not offset the expected decline in the gross mortality rate, 
since it has reached relatively low levels. As a result of these trends, 
the natural growth rate of the population will drop substantially in the 
future. If this is the case, in the year 2000 all these countries will 
have a much older age structure,' although much less so than Argentina or' 
Uruguay in 1975. The proportion of the population aged less than 15 years 
will be well below 40%; the proportion of persons in active age will be 
close to 60%; and the proportion of the population aged* over 65 years will 
increase very slowly, probably to not' more than 5% of the total population. 
The degree of urbanization attained in these countries varies considerably' 
/and will 
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arid will probably grow more rapidly where it is currently lowest; by the 
year 2000 it may reach percentages comparable to or even above-those'of ' 
the countries of the first group in 1975. The growth rate of the urban 
population, currently about 5% annually, will continue to drop slowly. 
The growth rate, of the rural population, which is at present less than 
1,5% annually, will continue falling and probably become negative in some 
countries before the year -2000 (in Venezuela this was already the case 
in 1970r-1975). 
: In most of the countries of the third group, there has not yet been 
a considerable decline in fertility, and therefore future trends are more 
uncertain. It would be logical to expect the decline to begin earlier and 
be more rapid in the .countries which are relatively more developed .from the 
economic and social standpoint. But many other unpredictable factors may. 
affect this order, chief among which are the coverage and effectiveness of 
private and state family-planning programmes. In-any event, the most• 
likely possibility is that fertility in these countries by the year 2000 
will be. of the order of the rates in the second group at present (global 
fertility rates of between 4 and 5). If projected mortality and fertility 
trends continue, the natural growth rate of the population will decline, 
but even so ih the year 2000 these countries will have average rates above 
2.5% annually. Since their present degree of urbanization is relatively 
low and the natural growth of the population will remain high, it may 
be expected that the growth of the urban .and rural population of this 
group of countries will be rapid during -this period, 
3. Demographic trends and education 
The future growth, composition and location of the population, and 
its integration for the labour force, are of particular importance for 
the basic objectives of any development ..strategy because,, they affect 
unemployment and underemployment, the extent of poverty and the very 
unequal distribution of income which prevail in the countries of the 
region. Demographic variables are equally important for the development 
of education, from the standpoint of magnitude as well as in many other 
respects, 
• ' /In the 
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In the light of present demographic trends, it is possible to 
identify some consequences which are now irreversible in the medium term. 
The first of these is the steady and rapid growth of the young population, 
which will directly affect the demand for education and training, as 
well as the size and structure of the labour force. The demographic 
growth of the past decades will generate an age structure in which the 
young school-age population and the potentially active population will 
predominate. The population aged less than 15 years, amounting to 144 iaillion 
persons in 1978, will rise to 227 million in the year 2000, with an estimated 
growth of 23 million persons. In addition, the population aged between 
15 and 64 years is growing at an annual rate of approximately 2,9%, so that 
the number of persons of active age will rise from 190 million in 1978 
to some 352 million by the year 2000. The economically active population 
was 55 million persons in 1950, 99 million in 1975 and is expected to 
reach 199 million persons by the end of the century. This implies the creation 
of approximately 100 million additional jobs. The magnitude of the task 
of providing productive employment foi1 so many persons of active age would 
appear to exceed the historical capacity of the regional economy, according 
to provisional CEPAL estimates, since even in the case of relatively high 
regional economic growth of about 6% annually, and assuming that there 
are no unexpected changes in the patterns of economic and technological 
change, total employment would probably not grow by more than 2.2% annually 
to the year 2000. Consequently, if these estimates are borne out by the 
fact, the present rising trends of unemployment and underemployment of the 
regional labour force will grow still worse in the future. 
Another major consequence of present population trends is that all 
the countries of the region will become predominantly urban within 20 years. 
Whether this result is desired or not, nearly 80% of the region's population 
will be urban, and two-thirds of that population will live in cities of 
more than 20,000 inhabitants. In the southern countries, the urban 
population will be relatively more important than this average; and in all 
the other countries the rural population will account for considerably less 
than half the total population. 
/This population 
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This population growth will have serious economic and social 
repercussions which will affect educational development. 
First, there will be a considerable rise in the potential and 
effective demand for goods and services of all kinds, especially if there 
is an effort to achieve specific, targets for. improving the standards of 
living of all social sectors, and to reduce or eliminate poverty within . 
a reasonable period. 
Second, the expected growth of the urban population will place 
heavy pressure on physical, and social infrastructure and in particular will 
affect the demand for education by profoundly changing the composition, 
shape and relative importance of the rural and urban social strata. 
Third, urban growth will tend to attract large numbers of unemployed 
persons from rural zones, thus increasing the impact on underemployment 
and marginal occupation in cities. , 
Fourth, it is likewise clear, that this growth of the population will 
broaden and diversify the Latin American market in the extent that it is 
possible to promote a dynamic process of absorbing labour productively,, 
raising per capita income and improving income distribution. 
Finally, this process will generate different kinds of quantitative 
and qualitative pressure on the various levels of the.educational system, 
and tend to introduce new dimensions, targets and structures, in education. 
/IV. INCOME 
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IV. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY */ 
1* National income distribution 
The countries of the region display significant differences in 
household income distribution. The main features ofnthese differences 
can be seen from the summary description of the distribution in ten 
countries shown in table 7, which is based on estimates prepared from 
the latest available information, corresponding to the beginning of the 
present decade. The situations range from those prevailing in countries 
where there is a relatively smaller degree of inequality, shown by Gini 
coefficients of 0.5 or a little less, to countries with high concentration 
of income, as shown by coefficients of around 0.65. 
(i) Within all this variety, there are situations which are more or 
less typical. Brazil constitutes a special example of high concentration, 
with almost 59% of household income received by the highest decile, whereas 
only 5.6% is shared out among the 40% made up of the poorest households. 
The large distances separating different segments of the population are 
clearly shown by the fact that the average income of the highest decile 
is 43 times that of the average income of the poorest 40%. 
(ii) Honduras may be considered as representative of another group of 
countries with similar structural characteristics. - In this case, the top 
decile receives 52% of household income, while the bottom 40% receives., 
only 6.6%. This inequality is reflected in a concentration coefficient of 
0.63 and an economic distance between peak and base of 32 times the average 
income of the latter® 
(iii) Colombia and Mexico represent another class of distributive 
structure. The overall inequality is reflected in concentration coefficients 
of the order of 0.60 in both countries, with the richest 10% receiving half 
the total of household income. The differences between these two countries 
*_/ See CEPAL, The economic and social development..., op. cit., chapter II; 
CEP At/UNDP, La pobreza en América Latina"; Si"tuaci6n, evolución y 
orientaciones de políticas, PPC/DPE/0.1, 29 March 1979-, and 0. Altimir, 
"La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina", Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
N° 27, Santiago, 1979. 
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Table 7 • 






• at 1970 
prices) 
Percentile household groups Concentration coefficients 
0-20 21-40 41-60 ;6l-80: 81-90 91-100 ,,Gini Theil 
. Percentage share of total income 
Argentina 1970 1 208 : 4. 4 9.7 - 14.1 . 21.5; 15.1 35.2 0.44 0.15 
Brazil 1972 559 .1.6 4.0- 7.1, 14.2 ; 14.4 56.7 .. 0.66 0.38 
Colombia < 1972 575 . . . 2.0 ••4*5 9.5 i?.o,9 16.0, 50.1 0.61 0.30 
Costa Rica 1971 684 .5.3 3.7 . 13.3 ' 19.9 ,15.3 39.5 , 0.49 0.19 
Chile • 1968 823 • 3.7 S.3 13.1 - 20*4 .;l6q2 38.3 0.48 0.18 
Honduras 1967 275 2.0 4.6 . 7.5 16.2 • 17.5; 52.2 0.63 0.32 
Mexico 1967 800 •2.6 5.8 , • . 9»2 16O9 , ; 16-.2 . 49.3 • -0.59 0.28 
Panama 1970 ,, 868 : 1.7 5.3 11.2 20.4 . 17.8: 43.5 . 0.57 0.25 
Peru 1972 . 555 • -1.5 ' « 4.2 .; 9.6 20.0 18.5 46.2 0.60 0.29 
Venezuela 1971 1 163 .: 2.8 7.0 ' 12*6 :: 22.7 • 18.6 36.3 p. 50 0.19 




are to be seen at the base of the pyramid, since the share of the 4 poorest 
deciles is 6,5% in Colombia and 8.4% in Mexico'. This is reflected in 
an economic distance from peak to base of 31 times the average lowest 
income in Colombia and 24 times in Mexico, 
(iv) The overall income distribution in Peru has some features similar 
to those of the preceding group: a general concentration index of 0.6 and 
an economic distance from peak to base of: 32 times the average income of 
the latter* The share of the peak is smaller than in the preceding countries, 
amounting to a little over 46% of total income, but the share of the base 
is also smaller: 5.7%. 
(v) Panama also probably represents a special case: income concentration 
is rather less than in the countries referred to above, and the share of 
the top decile is similarly smaller: 43.5% of total income. 
(vi) income concentration is more moderate in Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica and Venezuela. In these countries the concentration coefficients are 
somewhat below 0.50, while the economic distance between the peak and the 
base is between 13 and 15 times the average income of the latter. The 
share of the top decile in total income varies from a little over 36% in 
Venezuela to a little over 39% in Costa Rica, while the poorest 40% receives 
between 9,8% (Venezuela) and 12% (Chile and Costa Ricaj of total income. 
The estimates of table 7, which show the total household income 
distribution by groups, are the most suitable for the analysis of social 
well-being. In contrast, the. distribution of income between individual 
recipients gives a better reflection of the inequality of income distribution 
as generated in the productive process. These inequalities may differ from 
those between households, inasmuch as there may be differences as regards 
rates of participation by members in the labour force and personal income 
within each.household. In Latin American countries, the inequalities of 
income distribution for individual recipients do not differ much from those 
for households. 
Another point which should be taken into consideration in this 
comparative analysis is the fact that a significant part of the income 
generated in productive units is not received by households, since a 
/proportion of 
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proportion of the gross operating surplus (value added at factor cost, 
less remuneration for work) corresponds to provision for depreciation of 
fixed assets. This proportion, which is in most cases between 10 and 
15% of the gross surplusamounts to 17% in the case of Chile and 20% 
in that of Panama and Venezuela, Moreover, private and public corporations 
capitalize a substantial part of the operating surplus generated by them, 
and this consequently does .not pass to the households. This institutional 
saving usually represents between 10 and 17% of the gross operating surplus 
generated in the.economy as a whole,""/ rising to considerably higher 
figures in Chile, Panama and Venezuela. The joint result of both types 
of appropriation is that households receive only between 60 and 80% - and 
in some cases less, than half -of the gross operating surplus. The saving , 
of national private.corporations and also, to some extent, the depreciation 
funds of personal enterprises, may affect the distribution of social well-being, 
as they constitute additions to the entitlements of .some recipients to 
share in the national wealth. Although they are not income which is 
actually received, they increase the potential future income and represent 
resources which are possibly available at a later data to their owners. 
The same type of effect may be attributed to the increase in the real value 
of non-renewable assets.If the income.thus earned is taken into consideration 
(which is not the case), the inequalities in distribution are greater 
than those noted. 
2. The urban and rural distribution of income . - ' > • • 
In most of the countries of the region, thè concentration òf rural 
income in the period covered by this research was somewhat smaller than 
that recorded in urban areas. Although the unequal distribution of wealth 
and technological change in the agricultural sector have a decisive influence 
in the direction of income concentration, the distribution of other factors 
*_/ This represents between 5 and 8% of the gross domestic product at 
factor cost, 
**/ This represents between 6 and 10% of the gross domestic product 
at factor cost. 
/which weigh 
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which weigh heavily in urban inequalities, such as segmentation of labour 
markets, education, family composition, etc., is probably less uneven.V 
The importance of consumption of the family's own products also represent 
a relatively equalizing factor at the base of the agricultural pyramids, 
and is undoubtedly reflected in the overall concentration.indexes. 
Any analysis of rural income distribution presents difficulties if 
it is not undertaken in the context of national and urban distribution. 
In the case of rural income, the fact must not be overlooked that much of 
the income generated in rural areas ends up being received by persons 
and companies residing in urban areas and aippears in statistical sources 
as having that origin.^/ Although the extent of this transfer may be 
difficult to estimate, its importance may be taken for granted since it 
may reasonably be supposed to represent a considerable part of the profits 
of the modern companies and absentee landlords operating in rural areas 
and residing in cities. Although the data on rural income distribution is 
not as abundant and detailed as the urban data, what is available appears 
in table 8, which includes data on three countries for the y6ars 1960 and 
1970. As is typical of the prevailing style of development, there is' a 
considerable concentration in the peak of the distribution, but also in 
the centre where the middle strata are located, at the expense of the poorest 
strata. However, there are major differences when a comparison is made 
between this rural distribution and the national distributions for the 
same years. First, a comparison of the data in tables 7 and 8 shows that 
the share of the rural bottom 40% is much higher and in some cases almost 
double the national average. Second, the opposite is seen when comparing 
the share of the top decile, i.e., the proportion of total national income 
V The explanation of the inequalities in rural distribution as a function 
of the generation of agricultural income is made more difficult, 
among other things, by the fact that some of the recipients of high 
agricultural incomes live in urban areas. 
*8V In household surveys, which provide the basic information for these 
studies, account is taken only of income received in the place of 
residence of the recipient, irrespective of the location of the 




BRAZIL, COLOMBIA AND COSTA RICA8 INCOME DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION, 1960-1970 
(Percentages) 
••••>-•!••••••. Income category 
Country Year 
Bottom Middle Top 
Total ' 50$ 10* 
Brazil I960 100.0 15.3 51.6 , 33.1 
1970 ,100.0 15.4 48.3 36.3 
Colombia I960 ' 100.0 10.2 • 39-4 " 50.4 
1970 ' 100.0 12.4 42.1 ' 35.5 
Costa Rica 1961 100.0 18.8 32.8 48.4 
1971 100.0 18.1 53.7 28.2 
Sources CEPAL, Las transformaciones pirales en América Latina» ¿Desarrollo social o marginación?, 
Cuaderno de la CEPAL Na 26, 1979, table 26, p. 81. ' 
/received by 
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received by the top- 10% is much larger than in the* corresponding rural 
decile.' Third, in contrast it may be seen that the middle 50% of the 
rural distribution receive a much larger proportion of income than the 
national average. Finally, it should be rioted that since average rural 
incomes are considerably lower than the national average, the average 
income of each category and group is likewise lower than its equivalent 
for the entire country or for the urban area. With 'regard to observable 
trends, the changes which have occurred appear relatively ambiguous. For 
example, the share of the top 10% declines in Colombia and Costa Rica and 
increases in Brazil. It is difficult to interpret these changes with the 
data available. However, two initial comments may be made; the first is 
that these changes may reflect the influence of short-term situations; 
and the second is that these changes perhaps represent a deepening of the 
process of agricultural modernization, with a greater shift of rural income 
to urban areas. 
The relative productivity achieved by the agricultural sector is 
undoubtedly present in the differences which are to be observed between 
the Latin American countries in national income concentration. While in 
Argentina the average income of the agricultural labour force is only 20% 
below the average for non-agricultural activities, and in Colombia and 
Costa Rica it is around half of that average, in most of the countries of 
the region agricultural wages are only between a quarter and a third of those 
in other sectors, and in Brazil and Mexico they are not even a fifth of the 
per capita product in the urban sectors.jV 
These ratios of the per capita agricultural product to that attained 
in non-agricultural activity reflect to a considerable extent the stage 
reached by the modernization of agriculture in each country. Whereas in 
Argentina probably less than one-sixth of the agricultural population is 
working in very traditional technological conditions which include to some 
extent subsistence activities, in other countries of the region traditional 
*/ These proportions refer to the average monetary product per economically 
active person at 1970 prices, and therefore incorporate the price 
relations prevailing in that year. 
/peasant agriculture 
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peasant agriculture may cover as much as two-thirds of the agricultural 
labour force, and in some of the Central American countries this proportion 
may be as high as four-fifths. 
Rural-urban migrations do not necessarily represent a transfer of the 
labour force to higher income activities, since a considerable part of 
the migrants simply go to swell the urban mass of unemployed or underemployed, 
or else are employed in activities which generate average.incomes only 
slightly higher than those of the traditional.agricultural sector. Thus 
in fact these migrations shift a considerable part of rural poverty to 
the cities. . , . . 
3. Technological heterogeneity in urban activities 
Latin American economic development is characterized by the coexistence 
of technological strata with marked differences of productivity in urban 
and agricultural activities. On the one hand, the incorporation of modern 
technology has been concentrated in the most dynamic or oligopolistic 
industries, while on the other there has been a considerable lag in the 
older industry and in small and medium-scale industry. The result of this 
has been that the industries which can be considered modern - with levels 
of per capita product comparable to, although generally rather lower than, 
those of the same activities in the industrialized countries - employ between 
15 and 30% of the population working in the industrial sector, but generate 
two-thirds of the industrial product, the rest of manufacturing employment 
being spread over activities which are of varying productivity but, as a 
whole, have average levels of productivity between one-fifth and one-sixth 
those of the modern industries and also lower than the average for the 
economy as a whole. Another significant part of the industrial labour 
force is employed in non-factory activities using very elementary technology, 
with levels of productivity comparable to those of traditional agriculture. 
The proportion of the labour force employed in these activities may be as 
little as 3%, as in the case of Argentina, or as high as 30% in the less 




In the services sector, too, activities have been developed which use 
technology similar to that employed in the industrialized countries: modern 
public transport systems, energy supply, communications, financial services, 
and in general all the services required by modern enterprises and the 
middle and upper strata. These services, with levels of average income 
close to those of the modern part of the industrial sector, employ anything 
between 30% and 10% of the total labour force, depending on the country» 
At the other extreme, around one-tenth of the economically active population 
is employed in the most informal types of services, with income levels 
similar to those of subsistence agriculture. There are considerable 
differences, however, in respect of the extent and variety of services with 
intermediate income levels, which include, a considerable part of commerce 
and transport, as well as the public service: this part of the services 
sector employs 40% of the active population in Argentina, around a quarter 
in countries like Brazil and Mexico, and a smaller proportion in other 
countries. Thus the differences in the,degree of income concentration 
observed between the countries of the region are closely linked with the 
specific profile of technological heterogeneity of their economic activities. 
• The evolution of income disparities 
There is very little comparable information available to allow the 
evolution of income distribution in the countries of Latin America to be 
measured with any accuracy. Only in the case of a few countries are there 
data which give an approximate idea. Apart from conjunctural fluctuations, 
it may be said that the level of the general concentration of earnings in the 
largest countries of the region has not decreased, and in some cases it 
certainly worsened during the 1960s, The slowing down of Latin American 
growth in recent years and the changes of orientation in the economic policy 
have also definitely been causes of a further aggravation of income disparities 
in a large number of countries. 
There is a generalized consensus that in Brazil income disparities 
increased significantly in the 1960s. The top decile of households certainly 
increased its share in total earnings by more than 8% between 1960 and 1972, 
/while the 
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while the share of the 40% at the bottom of the scale dropped by more 
than 2.5%9 and the intermediate strata experienced a relative drop of more 
than 6% in total earnings. In terms of absolute levels of real income, 
the earnings of the top decile increased 2,7 times, those of the intermediate 
strata did not quite double, and those of the bottom 40% only increased by 
slightly over 30%, while the real value of the aggregate available income 
of the households increased 2,2 times over the same period 1960-1972. 
Consequently, two-thirds of the increase in real earnings were absorbed 
by the top of the pyramid, and slightly' over 30% by the intermediate strata, 
while the base had a share of only something less than 3% in the total 
increase. 
In the other major countries of the region for which sufficient d? ..a 
exist, income disparities do not seem to have changed substantially during 
this period, except for the conjunctural fluctuations which may have been 
recorded. In Mexico, during the 1950s a moderate increase in the share of 
the intermediate strata was observed, and a slight increase in the share of 
the top decile, both with detriment to the bottom strata. During the 1960s, 
the shares of the different groups were maintained with slight modifications 
with advantage both to the', base .and to., the apex of the pyramid. 
In Argentina, the income distribution which had existed at the 
beginning of the 1950s deteriorated somewhat around 1961, with an increase 
in the earnings, of households in the top decile, to the detriment of the 
other groups. In the 1960s, however, this evolution was apparently 
inverted, with a moderate decline in the share of the apex of the pyramid . 
in the distribution and some relative loss in that of the base, both 
benefiting the intermediate strata. The. successive changes of orientation 
in the general policy and particularly in economic, policy during the 1970s, 
and the marked conjunctural fluctuations which took place at the same time, 
resulted in considerable changes and transfers in income, distribution. To 
judge by various important statistics, it seems evident that the present 
concentration of income is definitely greater than that existing,at the 
beginning of the decade, . 
/5. Influence 
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5. Influence of education on income distribution 
To a large extent the differences observed between Latin American 
countries as regards degree of concentration of income are associated with 
the quality and dissemination of education among the population. In order 
to estimate the.effects of education on remuneration it should be borne in 
mind that it is closely associated with the hierarchy of employment and 
to some extent the personal property of the income-recipients, all of which 
contributes to the formation of structural disparities in income 
distribution. Low or limited dissemination of education promotes structural 
conditions which further the functioning of stratified labour markets. It 
also strongly influences the persistent existence of underemployment, 
and low productivity activities. 
Table 9 contains two indexes which reflect the level of education 
among the economically active population in a group of countries whose 
population accounts for over 4/5 of the regional total. The first takes 
account of the average number of years of education per person employed and 
the second records the proportion of the active population without schooling. 
Generally speaking, the countries which record the highest educational 
averages also show the lowest percentages of population without schooling. 
If these educational indicators are compared with the indexes of income 
distribution (see table 7), this confirms the relationship between high 
levels of income inequalities and low levels of dissemination of education. 
Thus, around 1970, Argentina whose active population had an average of more 
than seven years' schooling while only 4% had had no schooling, showed a 
smaller inequality than Chile, with an average of almost six years' schooling 
and 8% of the active population without any type of schooling; Colombia 
and Mexico, where income concentration was greater, had an active population 
with an average of three years' schooling, a quarter or fifth of which had 
not received any schooling. Among the countries with the highest income 
concentration, Brazil had an active population with an average of a little 
over two years' schooling and 36% without schooling, while in Honduras 
the labour force had an average of not more than one year of schooling while 
43% of the population had not received any schooling. 
/Table 9 
Sable 13 
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Sources Data obtained from the CEPAL/UNICEF, Project on social stratification and mobility in 
Latin America, 1975. 
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6. The magnitude of poverty 
The existence -of mass poverty in Latin America has always been a 
constant and very familiar situation in the region. -The substantial 
economic growth achieved in recent decades has not had proportional 
repercussions on the earnings of the poors who are very numerous. This 
economic growth aggravates existing contrasts in the living conditions of 
different groups of the population,, and has made the existence of present 
mass,poverty more visible and at the same time more reprehensible. 
This experience has given rise to deep scepticism with regard to the 
traditiona.1 belief that economic growth alone would bring a solution to the 
serious and widespread' problems of poverty, unequal distribution of income, 
unemployment and underemployment, which have existed and still exist in 
the region. In other words, the fruits of the substantial economic growth 
have not been fairly distributed among the different population groups. 
Furthermore, if present conditions are maintained, it may be anticipated with 
a high degree of certainty that the share of the poor groups in the fruits 
of future growth will still remain at completely inadequate levels by the 
end of this century, 
(a) The incidence-, of absolute poverty 
It, is estimated that at the beginning of the present decade 40% of 
Latin American- households lived a situation of poverty, because .they were 
not able to acquire the minimum basket of goods and services for private 
consumption to meet their basic needs., while nearly half of them lived in 
conditions of extreme poverty in that their income was not even sufficient 
to acquire only the food which would provide them an adequate minimum diet. 
This means that around 1970 there were about 110 million poor persons; of 
whom some 54 million could be considered extremely poor. These estimates 
have been obtained on the basis of an analysis of 10 countries representing 
84% of the region's population. The cost of a nutritionally adequate food 
basket was calculated in dollars at 1970 prices for each country. It was 
estimated that, the minimum income to meet these food requirements and an 
adequate.minimum of other goods and services would9 in the urban areas, 
amount to twice the cost of the food, and slightly less in rural areas. 
/Comparing these 
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Comparing these minimum incomes with those actually received by the 
households determines the. incidence, of situations,of poverty and extreme 
poverty in the total population of.the countries. Table 10 gives the 
corresponding estimates, expressed in percentages of the households below , 
these lines of poverty and.extreme poverty. The differences in the 
incidence.of poverty between countries are considerable. These differences 
would appear to be associated with the structure of income distribution, 
and with the disparities in. the per capita product in each of. the countries» 
In countries like Honduras, around two-thirds of the population.were to be 
found in a situation of poverty. In Brazil, Colombia and Peru, poverty 
affected approximately half the households. In Mexico, it covered more 
than one-third of the population, while in Costa Rica and Venezuela the 
proportion was one-quarter. In ,Chile, the incidence of poverty was somewhat 
less, covering one-sixth of the population, and. it was still lower in 
Uruguay and Argentina. As regards, the rural population it is estimated that 
62% lived in conditions of poverty in 1970. . . • . 
(b) The relative dimension of poverty. 
The dimensions of poverty analysed up to now correspond to, situations 
of absolute deprivation compared with norms which claim to reflect the 
minimum physiological and cultural levels of living for a decent existence, 
in keeping with predominating life styles. The problem of poverty does, 
however, have dimensions which are somewhat different from the point of 
view of a relative definition, which takes into account deprivation in 
conjunction with the average levels of satisfaction of needs in each society. 
The comparison between the two classes, of measurement of poverty 
gives some idea of important aspects of the problem in each country: how v 
much inequality poverty contains, how far the norms of satisfying basic 
needs are from the country's average resourcesj.to what extent existing 
disparities may give rise.to situations of relative deprivation beyond the-
absolute minima, which may be as much or more socially significant than 
situations of absolute deprivation. 
Relative lines of poverty were traced on the basis.of these same data, 
on the distribution of income and consumption in each country, ;quantifying. 




LATIN AKERICAt ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF ABSOLUTE POVERTÏ AROUND 1970 
Percentage of households below Percentage of households below 
the poverty line the indigence line 
Urban Rtiral Total Urban Rural Tbtal 
Argentina 5 19- 8 -, 1 1 1 
Brazil 35. 73 49; 15 42 25 
Colombia : 38 1 54 45 . 14 . 23 18 
Costa Rica 15 50 24 5 . 7 6 
Chile 1? 25 17 3 11 6 
Honduras 40 75 65 15 57 45. 
Mexico 20 49 . 34 6 18 12 
Peru 28 68 50 8 39 . 25 
Uruguay 10 eoe eoo 4 o o o oo • 
Venezuela 20 36 25 6 . .19 10 
Latin America 2& 62 40 10 34 . ; 19 
Source» Oscar Altimir, La dimension de la pobreza en América Latina, E/CEPAL/L.180, 1978, p„ 81. . 
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average per capita income of the households as a whole. Although this 
norm is arbitrary, it has the advantage of being based on an idea of 
social justice particularly if it is considered that 10% of the richest 
households have an income about five times higher than the average. 
Poverty defined in this way affects a significantly larger proportion of 
the population than'poverty defined on the basis of Absolute norms. 
The differences observed in table 11 with regard to the dimensions 
of relative poverty at the national level are a. reflection of differences 
in thé degree"of inequality in income distribution- between the bottom half " 
and the rest of the social pyramid. In countries where disparities are ; , 
greater, half the population is below the relative standard. In the other 
countries - with the exception of Argentina and possibly Uruguay - slightly 
over one-third of the population will be considered relatively poor. Some : 
of thèse differences represent inequalities in the rural sector and between 
the rural and the urban population. There is greater uniformity among '< 
countries in the incidence of relative poverty in the urban areas, defined 
in relation to average urban income." Table 11 shows clearly that in nearly -
all the countries, between 35% and 45% of the urban population is to be .• • 
found below thé relative norm, while this index is slightly more than 50% 
in Brazil. At the other end of the scale, relative poverty would take..in a" 
quarter of the urban, population of, Argentina and Uruguay. > 
In examining'the different aspects and problems relating to the •'. .. 
dissemination of poverty and its causes, the governments of the region stressed 
the need for deep-seated changes in economic and social'structure and in 
public policies aimed at its final eradication. "The combination of some 
measures to alleviate poverty, such as the free distribution of food, 
employment in public works on a subsistence wage, promotion and facilitation 
of housing construction in segregated areas and with self-help systems, 
public services which tend to be differentiated in terms of quality and 
accessibility, are necessary in short term, but run the risk of converting 
the present situation of the poor into a systematic and permanent segregation, 
with different levels of services, qualities of housing and educational 




LATINAMERICA» ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE POVERTY AROUND 1970 
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Source: Oscar Altimir, La dimension de la pobreza en América Latina, E/CEPAL/L.180, 1978, 
Po 96o 
a/ Defined as half of the average household income. 
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so that the great marginalized sectors can contribute to the production 
effort, satisfy their basic needs and organize themselves in defence of 
their own interests. These measures should ensure a different orientation 
of investment and production and of the services provided by the State in 
such a way as will - effectively benefit the poor and the needy. •* This policy, 
of course, should be promoted in a context of economic and social dynamism 
which will^guarantee poor people sources .of work and higher real incomes, 
while ensuring adequate* growth"of the economy."^/ 
- 7, Housing solutions and income concentration 
It is estimated that half rural dwellings and nearly a third of urban 
dwellings are inadequate and insalubrious. The present levels o¥ public 
and private construction only very partially meet the requirements of 
population growth. The possibilities of making any change in this lack 
of housing are reaching their most critical point since the number of 
families who do not have access to the housing market for lack of adequate 
recources increases daily. This has given rise to the emergence of new 
types of urban settlements characterized by a high proportion of marginal 
and submarginal dwellings, constructed under precarious conditions with 
meagre resources and adversely affecting the prospects of an adequate 
development of housing in the cities, and of the^culture'and-quality of 
individual and social life in the urban environment. 
The growth of the population, even supposing a more moderate rate than 
the historical trend observed, will give rise to new housing problems and 
simultaneously will aggravate those already existing. The projections made 
show that the population of Latin America will double in the last quarter 
of the century. The greatest housing needs will, of course, be concentrated 
in the big cities because urban growth will absorb around 92% of the total 
population increase. It is also estimated that approximately two thirds 
of the urban growth will be concentrated in cities of 100,000 inhabitants 
and over. Hence housing problems will mainly be located in the major urban 
V "La Paz Appraisal", op.cit., 20 and 21. 
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settlements, where it may be assumed that urban households will triple 
between 1970 and the year 2000 to reach a figure of nearly 100 million 
dwelling units, a great part of which have not yet been built. Meeting 
the basic need for housing for everyone wili therefore require an-extraordinary 
effort if the equally-high figures for rural housing are added to the above. 
OVer the last decade the form of economic growth has been concentration 
and exclusion, particularly as regards income distribution. Consequently, 
there is'a highly concentrated demand for housing which absorbs a great 
part of the resources in order to attend to the needs of a small fraction 
Of the population; the rest lack the necessary resources to purchase their 
own dwellings in the market and are obliged to depend on the state assistance 
policies or find makeshift solutions; Income"concentration therefore leaves 
a. considerable proportion of the population outside the private housing 
marketj because their incomes are inadequate for solving their housing 
problems. According to estimates1, the cost of a minimum hoúsing unit with 
modest hygienic facilities is apparently not less than 3,000 dollars. Although 
this sum may vary from one country-to another and among regions, it is 
indicative of the comercial cost of >the most elementary dwelling in addition 
to which these costs are rising continually. If this cost is effective, and 
considering the present income distribution schemes, it may be estimated 
that more than half the Latin American population would have serious 
difficulties in buying houses at those prices.V ' 
•In general terms, public policies have not significantly changed the 
allocation of resources for housing.' However, there are substantial 
differences in how the countries have dealt'With the housing problems of the 
urban poor sectors. In some countries in which state intervention' in the 
economy as-a whole has been substantial, the solution of sites and services 
was adopted. This Consists in handing over a temporary dwelling in a lot 
of semi-urbanized sites, where the combined action of the inhabitants and the 
state would aim at a total provision of services in these areas, for the future. 




This type of solution, owing to its low cost, allowed mass attention and 
its application was the only solution within the reach of.the meagre incomes 
of the poor sectors. In other words,, as they obtained their land the 
settlers organized themselves to make demands for houses, schools, hospitals, 
electricity, transport and other services, This type of expectation 
created favourable conditions for a process of active mobilization and 
participation by the.people themselves. This solution, however, gave rise 
to a constant proliferation of squatting which put heavy social and 
political pressure on the state and the responsibility for finding satisfactory 
solutions. In the countries in which this phenomenon occurred, city perimeters 
grew considerably as the result of this form of mobilization by the people, 
who took over fertile land previously devoted to farming. The provision 
of infrastructure services always lagged behind this urban growth based on 
territorial expansion. All in all, the urban population/housing ratio 
underwent a favourable change compared with earlier periods. 
5. In other countries where the. state policies have been to intervene 
less directly in the economy and give greater support and facilities to 
private entrepreneurial activity, possible solutions have depended on 
possibility of access to the private housing market. This is only feasible., 
for persons who receive sufficient income and therefore have the capacity . 
for savings and investment for buying .their own houses. However, the public 
policies aimed at direct financing on special credits for the mass construction 
of .cheap housing for the I<ow income sectors have tended to decrease considerably, 
as well as facilitation policies or mere tolerance of the formation and 
activity of working-class organizations to obtain solutions within their 
scope, even at a very elementary level, to the. housing problem.. Despite 
everything, these makeshift solutions continued to proliferate because when 
there is no alternative they are the only available solution. 
/V. RURAL 
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V, RURAL DEVELOPMENT */ 
; 1. General trends 
The rural societies of'the Latin American countries are being 
transformed by numerous and deep-seated economic, demographic and social 
processes. Among the most important and specific of these processes is 
the technological and entrepreneurial modernization of rural areas, their 
integration into the urban system and the national arid international economy, 
the natural growth of the rural population and the migratory processes. 
From one' country to another these aspects of rural changes are more advanced 
or can barely be detected, but in all of them they are moving rapidly 
ahead and pose major problems to development efforts for the years to come. 
In these efforts to achieve full rural development and overcome the problems 
created by some present trends, rural education necessarily must play a 
key role,. 
The problems of rural development are of different types depending on 
whether they stem from situations which may be considered traditional, 
or whether they tend rather to have some relation with the development styles 
which are being put into practice. Among the traditional problems, mention 
may be made of the deterioration in land quality; the standstill in 
production and obsolete techniques; the lack of an adequate infrastructure, 
especially for marketing, financing and transport; demographic pressure on 
the land; the latifundium-mihifundium complex and, generally speaking, the 
unfavourable situation of the majority of the rural population compared with 
the urban population in terms of income levels and social services (education, 
health, recreation). As regards the second type, i.e., problems stemming 
from the form in which development actually ocCurs, the most important have 
their roots in the capital accumulation processes, the growing complexity 
of technology and the increasing dependence on the urban and international 
marketing and financing systems. This group of "interdependent processes is 
described as agriòultural modernization. 
^J Cf. CEPAL, "Las transformaciones rurales en América Latina: ¿Desarrollo 
social o rnarginaciSn?", Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N° 26, Santiago, 1979. 
/Tlie modernization 
The modernization brings with it deep-seated changes in the 
institutional structure and social composition of agricultural relations 
of production. In the first placethe high priority given to increasing 
yield and productivity makes imperative the concentration of substantial 
areas of high-yield land, investment and operating capital, the increase 
of the technological scale.and with it the training of the labour force, and 
development of adequate machinery for marketing production. All this 
..means that economic activity in rural áreas eáii be organized in the form 
of modern enterprises in the context of a dependent integration with -
agro-industry, the urban milieu and the international market," In brief,' 
the dominant trend is towards a move from the traditional estaté to the 
large, modern farm, which, leads to the emergence of a new class of 
entrepreneurs, part -proprietors .(latifundium-owner, intermediary, investor), 
and part professionals... Many of these organizations have their operating • 
base and the residence of their managers and proprietors in urban c'entres. 
Secondly, the large farm requires operating conditions which would not be 
possible without the presence of a great variety of prófessionals and' 
different technicians to provide the necessary services and carry out the 
functions of management, planning and supervision inherent in itv Fourthly, 
the direct work of production is carried out by a mass of wage earners 
comprising two categories: those who are permanent relatively skilled 
workers and those who only carry out sporadic and occasional work (mainly -
sowing, sugar-cane cutting and harvesting). The latter are closely bound 
up. with traditional and domestic agriculture in which they are minifundium-
cultivators or family economy workers. On a temporary basis, in order to 
supplement-their low incomes, they work as: day-labourers in modern sector 
agricultural work without uprooting themselves permanently from the rural 
milieu. Lastly,,mention should be made of the independent rural dwellers, 
who are not minifundium-cultivators, nor landowners, who carry out their 
agricultural activities in predominantly traditional conditions,' Generally 
speaking, it is difficult for them to incorporate themselves in the process 
of modernization and organize themselves on the scale of the modern -
enterprises, with the administration, technology,•financing'and marketing, 
/to which 
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to which they only have precarious access. They therefore compete very 
unfavourably with the modern enterprises. Poor harvests or falling prices-
mean that numbers of these independent rural dwellers, and also many 
minifundium-oultivators, are obliged to sell their lands and emigrate to the 
cities, joining the vast urban marginal population. 
A review of-, the processes of agricultural modernization shows that 
in all of them there is an important factor of facilitation stemming from 
state action to benefit the private modem sector. As a recent CEPAL study 
says, the enterprise which operates sheltered and stimulated by State -
protection, or through, its position in the great agroindustrial and/or. 
marketing, complex benefits from the distribution of state land, subsidies 
for,agricultural credit, remission of debts or moratoria facilities (credits 
and subsidized prices) for purchasing machinery and industrial inputs, both 
national and imported, and near exclusivity granted in terms of technical 
assistance and state agricultural research, etc.*/ In a development 
style in which state support promotes and benefits large-scale private 
enterprise, the role of the mass of poor peasants and wage-workers becomes 
unstable as may be seen from various indicators, including those relating 
to income distribution which reveal that the situation of nearly two-thirds 
of rural homes around 1970 was one of poverty. In fact, the traditional 
peasant population carries out several main functions: they supply and 
reproduce the labour force for the modern sector, and produce food for the 
market and also for théir own consumption. Although the specific situation 
varies considerably from one country to another and also among regions, 
the relation betwéen modern enterprises, permanent wage-earners and minifundium-
cultivators who are temporarily employed as day-workers would seem to adapt 
to a variety of rural development situations, whether in Mexico and Central 
America, in the rural farms of the coast of the Andean countries which use 
indigenous labour from the Sierra region, or in Brazil and Argentina.""/ 
Among the many variants of this situation may be included that of the semi-
migrant workers who live in the peripheries and urban slum settlements who 
^J CEPAL, "Las transformaciones rurales en América Latina...", op.citp.86. 
**/ CEPAL, "Las transformaciones rurales...", op.cit., pp. 76-77 and annex 23.' 
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during the day go to work in the country, as in the ease of the boias frias 
of-north-east Brazil or the temporary migrants who move in great 
international flows for seasonal work, like those from Guatemala to Mexico, 
Colombia to Venezuela, Bolivia and Paraguay to Argentina, or "the wet backs" 
of Mexico to the United States.' 
In the La Paz Appraisal the governments of the region made'the 
following balance of rural development: "The progress achieved in rural 
production has not given the expected results because the needs of large 
sectors of the rurai•population who remain outside the processes" of agricultural 
modernization or have been harmed by them remain unsatisfied.: The compelling 
forces of migration towards the 'cities have not been countered either (nor-
the process of disintegration of the archaic but still prevalent forms of 
production for actual subsistence and social security in the rural milieu). 
Urban and rural differences continue to increase, frequently to the 
disadvantage of those groups living in rural areas who do not benefit from-
the modernization of Agriculture" (point 24)', 
2. Education in rural development 
Education should be a key element in a .strategy to achieve authentic 
and equitable rural development. In fact, an educational development policy 
can only be efficacious within the framework of a coherent and integral 
development style in which all the policies comprising it.have general 
compatible and mutually strengthening objectives. Otherwise, any reform 
of rural- education would only serve to increase the.flows of selective 
migration of educated persons to the urban centres if a£..the same time . . 
agricultural structures were not transformed, in order to provide all the 
rural., population with larger numbers of more appropriate job opportunities 
and access to the sources of production: land, water, techniques, credits, 
etc* In so far as it is an integral part of these important transformations, 
education will be able to contribute to the success of rural development,. 
In order to respond adequatly to this challenge, account must be taken of . 
the fact that any planning of social change, including that which is 
objectively designed to. favour the majorities, will not be successful if 
/it is 
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it is riot based on the awareness and corresponding identification and 
participation of the peoples affected.^/ 
Consequently, an effectively integral rural development requires the 
participation of the major groups affected in each of ,rts stage,s,. i It is 
in the generation of this capacity that education finds .its most important . 
task and its severest challenge.. In order, to take part in the management . 
of their own development the poor .rural groups must break with their . 
isolation (geographical, social,-linguistic) by expanding and,deepening 
their information on national and international economic factors which to 
a large extent determine the possibilities of changing their situation. . 
They must also have a more.profound acquaintance with social and political . 
structures and w^th-the decision-making, processes which affect rural 
development, i.e., the.idea is to combine in a consistent whole the aims 
of education for work, for the change of structures and for self-assertion.**/ 
In brief, the peasants require an education which will assist them in 
meeting their technical needs and in becoming aware of their problems and 
providing themselves with the necessary organization to contribute collectively 
to their solution. 
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LABOUR FORCE AND TRENDS 
IN.URBAN EMPLOYMENT 
1. Growth of the labour force 
. The explosive growth of the economically active population certainly 
represents an exceptional challenge to development strategies and policies. 
With annual growth rates of the labour force of close on and even greater 
than 3%, which will not change in the immediate future although the-decline 
in population growth may be greater than anticipated, the employment problem 
will be very difficult to solve, and tend to become exacerbated with the' 
great mass which the unemployment and underemployment of the economically 
active population at present represents. 
' José Matos Mar, Educación, lengua y marginalidad rural en el Perú, 
UNESCO/CEFAL/UNDP, Dealc. 10, 1976, p. 81. ~ ' ~ ' ~ 
ü / Ibid., p. 22. 
/Estimates for 
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Estimates for thè next twenty years show that "the notable demographic 
differences which have been recorded among countries òf thè rè'giòri" will be 
accentuated still further in terms of their effect on employment." A group 
of countries, formed among others by Argentina, Cuba, Chile and Uruguay, 
will continue to slow their population process; however, their labour force 
will still increase at a higher rate than the" total population, and both 
will tend* to balance out around the year 2000. In another group, made up 
of Ecuador, Mexico and the majority of the Central Amèrican countries, the 
high rate of population growth will persist, although with a tendency to 
decrease in some. The labour force, however, will grow more rapidly than 
the total population. Lastly, a third group of countries including Brazil 
and Colombia, show'an intermediate evolutions their population growth wiil 
show appreciable decreases; but there will be an in'tensifièd increase in 
thè labour force at an annual rate of nearly 3% or over. This will be the 
case particularly because" the majority of the population of active age' 
which will comprise it has already been born and consequently" cannot be 
affected by future decreases in the birth rate. 
2. Changes in the structure of the labour markets 
The recent characteristics of economic development in Latin America 
already summarized involve three types of trends and modifications in the 
structure of employment, as will be seen in tal?le 12:jV (a) changes in 
the sectoral structure of the labour force, a relative reduction in primary 
sector occupations and growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors, in a 
sequence typical of developing countries, and different from the classic 
model of capitalism in the most advanced western countries; (b) changeá in 
the proportion in which the. "middle" strata are represented. The 
heterogeneous "middle" sectors of the urban areas, which are devoted mainly 
to non-manual occupationshave grown much more•rapidly than the sectors 
of manual workers in industry and the basic services, and even the groups 
classified as "marginated". This growth- of thè urban middle strata has ' 
V Carlos Filgueira and Carlo Geneletti, Estratificación ocUpacional. 
modernización social y desarrollo economico en America Latina, CEPAL, 
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I l i o 
Others 
Argentina I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 3 6 . 6 0 3 . 4 0 3 1 . 4 0 1 . 8 0 6 2 . 7 0 1 4 . 9 0 3 0 . 8 0 8 . 9 0 8 . 1 0 0 . 7 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 ' 3 8 . 2 0 1 . 3 0 3 2 . 4 0 4 . 5 0 6 1 . 1 0 1 3 . 2 0 3 4 . 3 0 - 1 0 . 0 0 3 . 6 0 : 0 . 6 0 
Brazil I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 3 0 0 . 0 0 1 4 . 5 0 0 . 8 0 8 4 . 7 0 4 9 . 2 0 2 2 . 0 0 6 . 9 0 6 . 6 O 0 . 1 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 3 . 3 0 0 . 7 0 2 1 . 6 0 1 . 0 0 : 7 0 . 2 0 4 2 . 2 0 2 0 . 1 0 7 . 9 0 - 6 . 5 0 
Colombia I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 3 . 1 0 6 . 0 0 1 7 . 1 0 > - 7 3 . 1 0 4 2 . 1 0 2 0 . 4 0 1 0 . 6 0 2 . 8 0 
1 9 7 0 ÍOO.ÜO 2 8 . 8 0 2 . 9 O 2 5 * 9 0 ' 2 . 9 O 7 1 . 1 0 3 7 . 0 0 1 8 . 8 0 1 2 . 3 0 3 . 0 0 3 . 1 0 
Costa Rica I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 - 2 2 . 1 0 2 . 0 0 1 9 - 5 0 . . 0 . 6 0 . . 7 7 . 9 0 4 4 . 3 0 1 8 . 2 0 9 . 7 0 5 . 7 0 0.00 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 = 1 0 0 . 3 0 2 3 . 5 0 0 . 3 0 75.eo 3 6 . 3 0 2 5 . 8 0 1 2 . 3 0 1 . 4 0 0.00 
Chile • i 9 6 0 • 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 2 . 1 0 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 1 0 I . 6 0 7 7 . 6 0 2 9 . 5 0 3 2 . 6 0 1 3 . 3 0 2 . 7 0 0 . 3 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 9 . O O 0 . 7 0 2 5 . 4 0 2 . 9 O 6 9 . 6 0 2 2 . 2 0 . 3 2 . 0 0 . . 1 0 . 7 0 4 . 7 0 1 . 3 0 
Ecuador I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 Í 5 . 0 0 1 . 7 0 1 2 . 4 0 0 . 9 0 8 5 . 0 0 5 5 . 8 0 2 0 . 8 0 6 . 9 0 1 . 5 0 0 . 1 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 - • 1 
El Salvador I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 2 0 1 . 1 0 1 0 . 9 0 0 . 2 0 8 7 . 7 0 6 1 . 7 0 1 7 . 2 0 7 . 9 O 0 . 9 0 0 . 1 0 
; 1 9 7 0 l O O o O O 1 3 . 6 0 0 . 8 0 1 1 . 7 0 1 . 1 0 8 6 . 3 0 4 5 . 6 0 1 5 . 6 0 6 . 4 0 1 8 . 7 0 0 . 1 0 
Guatemala I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 3 0 3 = 2 0 9 . 0 0 0 . 1 0 8 7 . 5 0 6 I 0 I Q 2 0 . 0 0 6 . 1 0 0 . 3 0 0 . 1 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 8 0 0 . 5 0 11.00 0 . 3 0 8 8 . 2 0 5 6 . 3 0 2 3 . 2 0 6 . 8 0 I . 9 0 0 . 1 0 
Honduras I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 9 0 o.eo 9 9 . 6 0 ' 0 . 5 0 8 8 . 9 0 6 5 . 6 0 1 0 . 6 0 8 . 0 0 " 4 . 7 0 Ò . 2 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 , 0 0 2 1 . 5 0 4 . 7 0 1 5 . 8 0 0 . 0 0 7 8 . 5 0 5 5 . 7 0 . 1 5 ? 3 0 , 6 . 4 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 . 1 0 
Mexico I 9 6 0 1 0 0 = 0 0 2 0 . 1 0 0 . 8 0 1 9 . 9 0 0 . 4 0 7 8 . 9 0 2 0 . 8 0 1 7 . 6 0 " 7 . 5 0 3 3 . 0 0 0.00 
: I P 1 0 0 . 0 0 • - 2 4 . 5 0 0 . 8 0 2 2 . 5 0 , 1 . 2 0 . 7 5 . 5 O 3 4 . 9 0 2 1 . 8 0 6 . 2 0 1 2 . 6 0 0.00 
Nicaragua I 9 6 0 . 1 0 0 * 0 0 m 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 9 . 2 0 1 . 6 0 1 5 . 9 0 1 . 7 0 8 0 . 8 0 4 4 . 3 0 2O08O 1 0 . 6 0 5 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 
Panama I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 * 4 0 • 0 . 6 0 I608O 3 . 0 0 7 9 . 6 0 4 4 . 5 0 . 1 7 . 0 0 1 1 . 1 0 7 . 0 0 0.00 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 , 0 0 2 3 . 4 0 0 . 2 0 2 2 . 6 0 0 . 6 0 7 6 o 7 0 3 8 . 3 0 2 4 . 6 0 1 3 . 2 0 0 . 6 0 0.00 
Paraguay I 9 6 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 4 . 3 0 1 . 3 0 1 1 . 9 0 1 . 1 0 8 5 . 7 0 5 1 . 4 0 2 1 . 5 0 7 . 9 O 4 . 9 0 0 . 1 0 
1 S 7 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 7 0 O06O 1 4 . 0 0 1 . 1 0 8 4 . 3 0 4 9 . 5 0 2 3 . 8 0 7 . 9 O 3 . 1 0 0 . 2 0 
Peru I 9 6 0 100.00 ' • ^ _ » 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 3 . 2 0 0 . 3 0 2 1 . 1 0 1 . 8 0 7 6 o 7 0 4 1 . 6 0 2 3 o 4 0 8 . 2 0 3 . 5 0 0 . 2 0 
Dominican 
Republic I 9 6 0 . l O O o O O 1 3 . 6 0 0 . 5 0 1 1 . 8 0 1 . 3 0 8 6 . 4 0 6 2 . 2 0 1 3 . 9 0 6 . 4 0 8 . 9 0 0.00 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 8 . 2 0 1 . 2 0 1 2 . 2 0 4 . 8 0 7 7 . 3 0 2 9 . 9 0 1 1 . 7 0 4 . 6 0 3 1 . 1 0 4 . 6 O 
Uruguay I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 3 5 . 8 0 2 . 6 0 3 0 . 7 0 2 . 5 0 6 4 . 1 0 1 4 . 3 0 2 9 . 3 0 1 2 . 9 0 7 . 6 0 0 . 1 0 
1 9 7 0 l O O o O O 3 4 . 9 8 1 . 4 4 3 0 . 6 4 2 . 9 0 6 5 . 0 2 1 4 . 9 0 3 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 7 0 7 . 1 0 1 . 2 0 
Venezuela I 9 6 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 8 0 O . 9 O 2 3 . 9 0 - 7 0 . 1 0 3 2 . 7 0 2 6 . 0 0 1 1 . 4 0 _ 5 . 1 0 
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 3 2 . 6 0 0 . 2 0 2 9 . O O 3 . 4 0 6 7 . 4 0 2 4 . 0 0 2 5 . 3 0 1 2 . 1 0 1 7 . 0 0 0.00 
Source: C. Filgueira and Co Geneletti 
Latina, op. cito, table III-l 
, Estratificación ocupacional, modernización social y desarrollo en América 
, pp. 51-52. 
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been maintained in the unusually rapid expansion of secondary and higher 
education and the increase of bureaucratic posts, public and private, 
which absorb those graduating from it; (c) changes in the dependent nature 
of the labour force expressed in the increasing degree of conversion to 
wage-earners of workers, in all sectors of production and at all levels of 
employment. 
3. Evolution of the schooling of the labour force 
As regards the evolution of the average schooling of the labour force 
it will be seen from table 13 that: (a) in all the occupational strata a 
sustained increase has taken place in schooling; Cb) the educational levels 
of the lower middle strata are similar to those recorded by persons employed 
in the upper strata consisting of employers, executive staff and higher 
posts, in industry, trade and services; (c) the level of education achieved 
by the lower middle strata -is comparatively very high, and this occurs not 
only in the countries with the highest general schooling in the -regions 
•such as Argentina and Uruguay, but also in others which are to be found in 
phases of rapid educational transition, such as Chile, Panama and Costa 
Rica. In a second group of countries, the average schooling of'lower 
.middle strata occupations is 8 years,-which shows fairly advanced levels 
of average education in these strata; (d) the most accentuated differences 
in average education are to be found between the middle and upper strata 
on the one hand and the manual occupations on the other. The educational 
profile of employment structure has therefore been modified in such a way , 
that it has brought the schooling of persons with manual occupations 
(upper and skilled workers) closer to that of persons with lower non-manual 
occupations (employers, supervisors and'technicians), the disparity between 
which has tended to decrease» 
/Table 13 
Sable 13 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING FOR SEVEN OCCUPATIONAL STRATA IN 15 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRHS 
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Argentina I 9 6 0 6 . 1 1 1 . 0 6 . 9 4 . 5 3 . 7 2 . 7 . 3 . 6 
1 9 7 0 1 1 . 6 8 . 6 6 . 2 5 . 9 4 . 4 6 . 3 6 . 3 
Brazil 1 9 6 0 - 4 . 7 1 0 . 6 7 . 2 2 . 7 2 . 4 0 . 9 5 . 2 
1 9 7 0 e o o e o o e o e OOO o e o o o o OOO 
Chile I 9 6 0 e . 9 1 0 . 8 8 . 1 . 4 . 9 3 . 8 • 2 . 5 7 . 1 1970 9 . 1 1 1 . 8 8 . 7 5 . 2 4 . 6 3 . 1 7 . 0 
Costa Rica I 9 6 0 7 . 1 1 1 . 4 6 . 1 4 . 1 3 . 2 2 . 4 3 . 2 
1970 7 . 9 1 0 . 6 7 o 3 4 . 5 4 . 2 , . 2 . 9 ' 3 . 4 
Ecuador , I 9 6 0 6 . 6 l O o O 6 . 0 3 . 7 2 . 7 1 . 8 3 . 1 
1 9 7 0 o o a- o e e - / • o o o OOO eoe OOO e o o 
El Salvador I960 5 . 1 9.4 4.7 2 . 8 1 . 8 0 . 6 2 . 5 
1970 6 . 4 1 0 . 1 5 . 5 3 . 6 - 2 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 8 
Guatemala . I960 4.4 8 . 5 5 . 6 2 . 3 1 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 8 
1970 5 . 9 1 0 . 0 ' 6 . 3 2 . 6 2 . 1 0 . 8 2 . 2 
Honduras I960 6 . 7 ; 9 . 0 4 . 8 2 . 4 1 . 7 0 . 7 1 . 2 
1970 ««« o e o o e o e e o OOO e o e e o o 
Mexico 1 9 6 0 3 . 8 8 . 5 6 . 2 • 3 . 5 2 . 3 1 . 7 1 . 4 1970 6 . 2 9 . 3 5 . 6 3 . 5 2 . 9 1 . 6 2 . 6 
Nicaragua I960 o o o e o o o o e e o o e o e o o e e e o 
1970 6 . 9 10.2 5 . 1 3 . 1 2 . 0 0 . 7 1 . 8 
Panama I960 ' 8 . 5 11.1 8 . 5 . 5 . 4 4 . 3 2 . 0 3 . 1 1970 9 . 0 1 1 . 8 8 . 6 5 . 5 4.9 2 . 4 3 . 5 
Paraguay 1960 9.4 1 0 . 8 7 . 7 3.9 3 . 5 . 2 . 3 4 . 3 1970 8 . 4 1 1 . 3 7 . 5 4 . 3 3 . 9 2 . 7 5 . 0 
Peru I960 e e 9 e o o OOO e o e eoe e o e e o o 
1970 8 . 1 12.0 7 . 0 4 . 6 4 . 3 2 . 1 4 . 1 
Dominican 
Republic I 9 6 0 7 . 9 9.4 5 . 4 3 . 6 2 . 6 1 . 4 2 . 5 1970 6.7 10.1 6 . 4 3 . 6 3.2 1 . 7 2 . 0 
Uruguay I960 6.1 9 . 8 6 . 5 4 . 3 3 . 7 2 . 6 4.0 
1970 o o e e o o e e e oe e e o o e o o e o o 
Source: Carlos Filgueira, ttxpans 
UNDP, 1977), table 33» 
y estratificación social en America Latina, 1960-1970 (UNESCO/CEPAL/ 
Inconsistencies 
Inconsistencies between occupational strata, educational 
attainment and income levels 
The dissemination of education has not been accompanied by a fairer 
distribution of income. On. the contrary, it has already been pointed out 
that in recent years income*has tended to become even more concentrated. 
•This reiterated observation brings out the-lack of congruence between the 
education received and the .income received by a great part of the population 
occupying lower middle class posts: i.e., administrative, officials, office-
workers , subordinate personnel in industry, trade arid services, and some 
categories of higher middle class occupations.* such as professionals and 
semi-professionals employed by the public bureaucracies. 
The different trends in occupational stratification, educational 
attainment and income distribution show the great structural inconsistencies 
Which affect a great part of the middle strata. The, factors.which 
determine the social aspirations of these sectors of .the population are 
access to posts of officials or employees with high educational attainment 
close or similar to those of the highest occupational strata.- But since,., 
their incomes are relatively low, this creates an apparently contradictory 
situation because the factors which generate the aspirations and give them 
legitimacy - education and- employment prestige - do not correspond to the 
level of remuneration obtained. 
5.' Wage differentiation and occupational stratification 
- The changes observed, in occupational stratification which have taken 
place within the framework of the prevailing development style have given 
rise to an increasing heterogeneity in the structure of the urban labour 
markets. Differentiation and segmentation are fundamental characteristics 
of this structure. There are many levels of transversal and horizontal 
cleavage which divide the markets into different strata and segments. One 
of the most striking effects of".the segmentation of the labour markets in 
Latin America has been the increasing differentiation of urban workers.' 
wages. The minimum real wage has tended to be maintained or to register 
slight increases, while the average worker's wage in the modern urban 
sector has achieved considerable advances. For example, in Sao Paulo 
/between 1969 
-57 -
between 1969 and 1975, the average increase in wages of the workers of 
the lowest stratum was 16%; the. wages of the middle categories increased 
between 35 and 42%; the increase in the top categories was 63%, while the 
average figure for'management posts rose by 87%.jV In .the same period 
the average minimum real wage remained stationary. In addition to the 
occupational level, there are also indications that the structure and trends 
in wages are differentiated and depend on the size of the enterprise, whether 
this is measured by the number of employees or by the exercise of its 
market power. 
These wage differences are partly to.be explained by institutional 
factors such as the size of the unionized force of the workers and the level 
of profits of the modern enterprises operating in concentrated markets. 
The main explanatory factors are, however, more complex and are to be 
found processes which lead to the formation of the so-called "internal" 
markets in the modern formal sector. These internal markets determine 
employment and wage rises and structures in modern enterprises in such a 
way as to make them relatively independent Of the situation of the labour 
market outside the firm. Among the most important should be mentioned: 
the levels of general knowledge and specific aptitude required-for a given 
job, the technological ranking of the enterprise, in service training and 
the ease, with which the enterprise can pass on wage rises to the consumer. 
In choosing their workers in the internal labour market, employers seek 
qualifications and signs which attest to the capacity of adaptation of 
the candidates to the work milieu, their ability to make their careers in 
the enterprise and a measurement of their training potential. 
This process serves to differentiate the workers of the informal 
sector from those of the formal sector of the labour market. The functioning 
of the segmented labour markets leads to higher income concentration which 
relates to the importance of the modern enterprise in the present 
concentrating phase of capitalism. Increased participation by the big 
V Paulo Renato Souza, La segmentación del mercado de trabajo urbano y 
las disparidades de.salarios en economías subdesarrollauas (PREALC, 
Santiago, 1977); Oscar Muñoz, Dualismo, organización industrial y 
empleo, (CIEPLAN, Santiago, 1977), 1-7 " 
/oligopolistic and 
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oligopolistic and modern enterprises in the total product, with a much 
smaller share in manpower.absorption,, encourages the formation of growing 
wage differences. This structural differentiation which benefits their 
personnel brings different categories of workers, face to face in the 
fight for wage increases, s,ince it is difficult to raise wages selectively 
in the lowest strata without affecting the entire wage structure. Since 
.any readjustment of. this type would prejudice the relative position of the 
sectors of the most favoured part of the working population, it is very 
probable that strong social pressures will emerge within the organizations 
of the specialized workers which will tend to maintain the advantages 
acquired. 
6. - Segmentation of the labour markets and ».education 
The processes of differentiation arid occupational Stratification of 
market segmentation and increasing wage disparities just described have 
deep-seated repercussions on the evolution of the' education systems of 
Latin America, because education plays a decisive role in development. 
In this framework, the employers change the former emphasis on economism 
focussed almost exclusively "on the relation between the marginal 
productivity expected from each worker and the wage he receives. Now in 
recruiting a person in a specific labour market they shift the fociis of " 
attention towards the training potential and the possibilities df each 
candidate for professional development and adaptation in the enterprise. 
In the modern sector, where growth is higher, the changes referred 
to have determined the educational attainment" required for the different 
types of work. At the present time, education tends to act as'an 
anticipation of the capacity for adaptation, the learning potential and 
the discipline required in modern, hierarchical arid bureaucratic 
enterprises. The presence of an educated labour force in rapid expansion 
has produced a situation in which the growth rate of the requirement of 
more years of schooling is greater than that of the real needs for knowledge 
to carry out formal types of work. As has been observed, in .the industrial 
sector recruiting criteria have changed substantially ¿nd the mere number 
of years of. schooling is becopiing increasingly important. , In some' cases 
• • • • ' . . .' t 
/of technical 
of technical progress this can be explained by the fact that the posts 
have become more complex and require'greater technical skills, while in 
others the opposite occurs, since the work has been simplified, is merely 
repetitive and above all requires the capacity for adapting to the working 
pace imposed by machinery. On the other hand, it has been ¿eriously 
questioned whether formal education is the machinery which effectively 
provides the necessary skills for satisfactorily performing the new jobs 
created by technological development;- For example, it has been found in 
Argentina that in the industrial sector the same class of work is carried 
out by persons with very varied educational attainments. A specific type 
of education (in this case technical) qualifies a person for access to a 
broad variety of jobs, the majority of which lack any relation to the 
formal training the person has received.^/ A factor which plays an important 
role in the generation of these differences is training for work which 
operates as a functional alternative when formal education is inadequate. 
Owing to the fact that the interaction between the type of skills 
education provides and the real technical needs of the economies is 
imprecise and diffuse, formal educational requirements are used as factors 
of prestige and machinery for selection to reserve the most coveted jobs 
for the social strata whose children are in a position to acquire the 
educational qualifications required. ' It is not still very clear how 
educational attainment differentiates and hierarchizes the labour force. 
There is no doubt that the years of education acquired constitute a 
fundamental consideration, but the relationship is neither unidimensional 
nor linear. For example, the fact of possessing a certificate of secondary 
education is in some sense á pass to obtaining a non-manual job; literacy 
brings with it obvious advantages to many persons belonging to the informal 
sector and to minifundium-cultivators; and to be a graduate from a prestige 
university is of primordial importance in countries where higher education 
institutions have proliferated in recent decades. But since the growth of 
Juan Carlos Tedescó, "Algunas características de la educación e indus-
trialización en'- America Latina", study presented at the First Seminar 
on the Project: Development and Education in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, UNESCO/CEPAL/UHDP, Quito, 13-17 September 1977. 
/the secondary 
the. secondary. and higher education is more rapid than the ?upply of 
appropriate jobs, increasingly higher educational barriers are continually 
being placed in the way of access, to office, jobs and even .manual occupations. 
The relative "over-expansion" of secondary and higher education has been 
accompanied by artificial.changes in many occupations effected by a change 
of name and legal.status. .This is particularly reflected in the nominal 
growth of occupations in the urban middle and upper occupational strata, 
thus dissimulating their.real significance in respect of a real improvement 
in levels of employment and productivity of . the econony.V The workers 
coma to be called "employees", "officials" or "technicians"; the 
subprofessional specializations receive, professional university diplomas» 
This tendency, plus the fact that educational supply creates its own demand, 
has already had important consequences for the growth of. the public and 
private bureaucracies, whose-contribution to the development process and 
the satisfaction of basic needs is fairly debatable. In several senses, 
they constitute occupational areas of refuge for broad contingents of the 
educated middle.classes. For example, it has been estimated that in Brazil 
the public sector absorbs nearly 50% of the total number of white-collar 
jobs in the non—agricultural sectors;.and in.Argentina employment in the 
public sector.increased at an annual rate of 5.6% between.1970 and 1975, 
compared with. 0.9% in the period between I960 and 1970.•"'•'/ 
Another problem is the rapidity of the increase in enrolments, in 
secondary and higher education institutions which.frequently takes the form 
of a general deterioration in the quality..of the schooling and-therefore 
in the quality and prestige of the certificates granted by the different 
institutions. In so far as the appreciation of the qualifications of 
academic education.in the job markets diverge from employment needs there 
*/ CEPAL, "Desarrollo hymano y cambio social y crecimiento en America 
Latina", Cuadernos dé la CEPAL, N°'3, Santiago, 1975, pp. 31-36 and 
; 46 to 48. ' 
**/ Paulo Renato Souza, La segmentaciSn del mercado de trabajo urbano; 
las disparidades de'salarios en economías súbdesarrolladas, PREALC, 
Santiago, 1977, p. 32; Juan José Ilach, "Estructura ocupacional y 
dinámica del empleo en la'Argentina: sus peculiaridades, 1947-1970", 
Desarrollo Económico, 17:68 (January-March 1978). 
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will be no external;means of proving this possible decline in•professional 
quality. While the employers seek effective, technical qualifications they 
will only .give, credit to diplomas from..some elite institutions and will•• 
give increasing support to private institutions so as to obtain a reliable 
supply. , . , , 
Generally speaking, the. consequences of the interaction- mentioned 
above between the occupational structure, the labour markets and education 
are sucji that persons with low levels of schooling have increasingly few .-• 
possibilities of obtaining employment-in the formal, sector, . In the urban • 
labour market their choices are limited to the activities comprising the 
informal sector: domestic and personal services, itinerant trading and 
the lowest levels of construction. Although those persons with a low 
educational'attainment can work in the informal sector of industry, recent 
studies show that this''sector does not absorb any significant number of 
persons' without' formal education.*/' 
This'-situation indicates an important change'in the'role of indus try-
in respect of the social"strata with low levels of educational attainment. 
The origins of the industrial 'process'both in the advanced western countries 
and in the Latin American countries which' entered the stage of industrial 
development earlier were characterized by the large scale of absorption of 
the labour force with a low level of schooling. ' However, in' the casés of 
more recent industrialization, industry no longer carries out this role. 
In order to explain this lack of dynamism in the création of new jobs many 
of the reasons'already given in connexion with the segmentation'of the 
market may be used: changes in the structure of industrial manpower, the 
larger-number "of persons with a high level of educational attainment 
seeking employment in the industrial labour'market, the fact that more 
years of schooling are required,'etc. 'A recent study shows that at both 
ends of the spectrum of industrialization in the region - the cases of 
Argentina', the country with the earliest industrialization, and El Salvador 
which is just now beginning - there exists a tendency to bypass persons 
*/ Tedesco, "Algunas caràcterîsticas de educaciSnop.cit., p. 
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with a low level of educational attainment. In the first of these countries, 
those most affected were the foreign immigrant workers, while in the 
second it seems that the effects of industrialization are creating a 
particularly critical situation for craftsmen and people working in small 
businesses. The situation is further aggravated by the evidence that non-
educated- persons only have restricted access to non-academic means of 
education in order to make up for their lack of schooling. Partial data 
show that those who take part in non-academic education programmes are 
almost exclusively persons who have already had several years of- academic 
education.*/ 
7. Education "and employment opportunities 
One of the most couplex problems arising at the present time which 
will no doubt come to the.fore in the 1980s is the role of education in 
preparing the full participation of young people in the region's development 
processes. The main consequences °f "the above , growth of the occupational 
structure, and especially of the middle strata, were already felt in 1970. 
An analysis of available data made recently shows that.in the group aged 
between 20.and 29 years of.age secondary and higher education increased 
very much faster than the corresponding employment opportunities, and since 
this trend persists in this decade the young people must face up to a 
growing divergence between the level of education they possess and existing 
employment opportunities.**/ Not only is there "over-education" for the 
present age. groups of 20 to 29 and 30 to 39.with medium- and medium-high 
level jobs, but it is still.more evident in respect of the occupational 
strata situated lower down and made up principally of young people. In 
14 countries examined, without exception,.the middle and-upper occupational 
strata could only absorb part of those graduating from secondary and higher 
education and in five countries the proportion absorbed was only half. :'»'"V 
This means, therefore, that an increasingly large proportion of young 
educated Latin Americans have no possibility of obtaining middle-class jobs» 
*/ Ibidem., p. 
**/ Filgueira and Geneletti, Estratificaci6n ocupacional ..., op.cit., 
pp. 163 to 168. • •, • 
***/ Ibidem., pp. 163 to 175. 
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' The labour markets in tfre next decade 
Even with the most optimistic hypotheses of economic growth and 
structural changes that can be imaginedB all those persons who have analyzed 
the problems come to the conclusion that over the next 10 to 15 years in 
many countries the levels of under-utilization of the' labour force will be 
high, and similar to or greater than those recorded at the present time.*/ 
Furthermore, other motives indicate that during the next decade new; pressures 
will emerge which will be added to the trends already described. : 
The growth projections of the population arid the labour force indicate 
that up to the end of thé century there will1be continuing pressures to 
obtain job opportunities. However, it is possible that in the next few 
years the forms taken by these? pressure's may vary. In addition to increasing 
in scope and intensity, it is most probable that in most of the1 region 
important changes will take place in the structure of the labour force. 
The most important will be the permanent shift towards a predominantly urban 
labour force with high concentration in the metropolitan areas, although it 
is probable that' thiá increase will come f¥om different sources.' "After the 
last postwar period a substantial part of the growth of the urban labour 
force was due to the arrival of migrants from rural "areas. Since the 1970s 
there has been evidence that recent migrants will be relatively less' 
important;''rapid urban expansion will be increasingly due to'new generations 
of young people who have been born and who have grown up in urbaíi áreas. 
In addition to this there is the problem of the radical increase in the ' 
rates of participation of young women in the labour force, particularly in 
some more urbanized societies with modern economies.**/ It is probable that 
*f CEPAL* Long-term trends and projections of Latin Amërican economic 
development, E/CEPAL/1027 (March. 1977). -, • ~~ • 
**/ Recent IL0 projections reveal substantial increases in the..rates of 
participation of women in the labour force for the year 2000, 
' particularly in the age groups 20 to 24 years of age. The increase • 
in the rate of participation in respect of this group between 197.5 
and the year 2000 is 42.7% for Latin America; 13.9% for Argentina and 
-- 60.6% for Brazil and Mexico; IL0, Labour force estimates and 
pro je ctions 19 75-2000,, second edition, Geneva, 1977. • 
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the expectations and performànce .of these new contingents of persons 
incorporated into the labour market will be different from those incorporated 
at an earlier date. 
In connexion with this problem» the states members of CEPAL which 
took part in the eighteenth session of the Commission .in La Paz concluded 
that: "There are serious doubts as ,to whether the informal sector can 
continue to carry out the functions which it has relatively successfully . 
engaged in.to date. The growing^demand for employment among sectors of 
increasingly^educated young^urban dwellers who are facing ever greater 
difficulties^ in finding sui table .¿jobs can hardly be palliated by the 
substitute constituted by the informal sector9 where the lowest-qualified, 
_r .transitory and poorest paid .jobs predominate. Something similar is to be 
expected as a result of . the increased flow of educated women seeking to . 
enter the. job market. This is a so.urce of tensions which will tend to get 
worse with the rapid growth of these sectors of the .population,.particularly 
..the new.generations of men and women graduating from secondary and higher 
education, for whom the informal sector.has no solutions to offer".*/ 
The possible inefficiency of the educational system as a means of 
putting the employment and incoile opportunities of the .mass of the population 
on a level has been called in question by the changing conditions of the 
regional labour market. One of the. nost important tasks for education in 
Latin America over the next decade will be to face up to the contradictions 
and challenges brought.on by.its present crisis of readjustment and expansion. 
In this context, the educational paradox of Latin America consist^ in the 
fact .that at the same time high rates of "inflation" in the educational 
system (drop in the economic value of a specific degree of schooling in 
the labour market) exist alongside regressive trends (financial crisis of 
education, particularly higher education, linked with"the: fiscal crisis 
of the State in the 1970s; and an.¡increasing group or.women and young 
people with levels of educational attainment.higher than/the average who 
are being occupational'ly wasted). The contradictions, inherent in: the 
process, plus the growing pressure placed òri thè predominant Vde.vélòpment 
style pose major challenges to the region's-.states in reaching -.effective 
and politically acceptable solutions. 
£/ La Paz Appraisal, op.cit., point 23. 
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•; , VII. STRUCTURAL. CHANGES AND EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 
• i 1'* The differentiating trends of social modernization and 
educational evolution 
One of- the most striking features of the styles, of development which 
produce• concentration lies in the rapid increase in. social differentiation. 
This is demonstrated by social indicators in such fields as population 
dynamics and the geographical distribution of the population, in the 
structure of employment and wages, in segmentation of the labour markets, 
in job stratification and mobility, in educational opportunities and the 
economic value of education, in the types and degrees of the consumption 
,and the opportunities available in urban..and rural areas, and in the contrast 
between the continuing participation of the elites in charge of the economy, 
the society , and the state and the limited,,.real participation of the sectors 
which make UP most of the population. The scales which may be formed in 
these fields show a growing gap between the broad base of the social 
pyramids and their.narrow,apex, and tendencies for discontinuities to appear 
in th$ values of the indicators, largely.as a.result of the presence of 
concentrations and lines of ..breakage which indicate the existence of the 
sharply-defined social barriers. 
An example illustrating this process of social differentiation can 
be found in the field of education whose different levels have become 
horizontally diversified and vertically separated. J All this has occurred 
in an extraordinarily dynamic and expansive process-of social coverage of 
the educational systems, which has far exceeded the growth.rates of any 
other social subsystem.linked.to development. This educational;growth has 
not taken place without major internal .imbalances as may. rapidly be seen, 
in the fact that a.large, propprtion of the population, not less than half 
in the majority of the Latin American countriesdo not succeed in completing 
their basic primary education; this definitely prevents them from going on 
to secondary and higher education, obliging them to remain in a state of . 
semi-illiteracy which has adverse repercussions on their subsequent 
. possibilities of training and apprenticeship. This then is the first ..and 
biggest step of social differentiation. Those who can continue their post 
^ • /primary studies 
primary studies find that .the next .¡level., i.e., s e c o n d a r y education, has 
now become a ramified structure in which there are several types of 
secondary education, some.of them terminal,.others with some .possibility 
of post-secondary improvement, for «¿nor professional carreers, while lastly, 
therp is the classical secondary education which is basically a stage 
leading on to the: university. There-is . still a generalized tendency to ^ 
fragment classical, secondary education, i^to two..phases, one general and . 
the other preparatory and. leading on to higher studies. 
However, it is in the university itself .where., this process of _ 
hierarchization. and internal; differentiation in education has - become most 
obvious, with deep-.rooted social consequences. In .the first place, . ( 
pre-university, courses have proliferated and carry out different functions, 
manifestly of a preparatory nature; but at the same time, -they, are a latent 
means .of creating additional barriers to discourage, the least prepared . 
aspirants because, they contribute to lengthening the courses. As is well, 
known, this, has an adverse effect on the capacity of low-income families . 
•to keep their children in the university. Lastly, mention, should be made. 
of the fundamental inportance acquired in recent year's by postgraduate 
studies: master's degrees and doctorates, which are generally very 
expensive and selective. In brief, this differentiation within the 
university implies the existence of up.to four clearly differentiated 
categories of studies,, each, of which constitutes an eliminatory requirement 
for advancing towards the next highest phase. 
This picture of increasing educational differentiation would be further 
complicated if it were related, to. th.£-effective connexions which the higher 
steps of the educational system maintain with the no less fragmented and 
hierarchized network of the job markets,.where educational credentials are 
of capital importance»., partly because, they constitute the obligatory 
requisite for,access to them. In other words, without the required 
educational diploma, :it is not possible to conpete in a series , of reserved 
labour markets, which are more selective and exclusive the higher the 
category of the jobs involved. In another section, of this document the 
problem of the hierarchization and segmentation of markets has been analysed 
in greater detail;*/ . ., 
*J Cf; H. Kirsch, El empleo en America Latina: mirada retrospectiva y 
perspectivas para el futuro (E/CEPAL/DS/183, November 1978). 
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2, The importance of the middle sectors and "elitizing" 
' '' ' of education 
Perhaps one of the most significant areas of social development in 
which the structural inconsistencies and asymmetries betwèen productive 
growth and transformation of society"are manifested, is'that involving the 
formation and expansion of the différent urban middle strata and sectors 
which constitutes one of the more important aspects of social modernization» 
The factors which are contributing to tli¿ process of growth and deep-seated 
structural changes in these sectors and which can be said tó be the most 
important are; rapid urbanization and growing metropolitariization; the 
tremendous growth of education at the secondary and higher levels; the 
growing bureaucratization of public and private activities; the great 
increase in professional services and particularly those of an assistential 
and educational nature; the specialization, mechanization and increasing 
complexity of many economic arid state activities; and lastly, the 
predominance of middle class cultural patterns. All this has'contributed 
to a considerable extent to' the opening up of new and better job opportunities 
for members of thèse classes, with numerous repercussions in'the social' 
structure and the development process.jV 
If this procéss is carefully observed it would seem possible to affirm 
that it has been occurring with a rapidity and intensity which bears no 
relation to what might have been ejected from the rate at which the economy 
has grown arid changed̂ " Both thé growth of education and the creation of 
urban jobs for thè middle sectors'can only b¿ explained in part by the 
expansive dynamism of some economies which have tended to restrict the 
creation of techriical jobs, especially where they have adopted a technical 
modernization which tends to save work by incorporating equipment and 
production procedures designed'with this aim. This has given rise to what 
has been termed "spurious absorption" jV oif employment iri the public sector 
On this point'see:' C. Filgueira and C. Gerieletti, Estratificación ocu-
pacionalj;modernización -social y desarrollo económico en America Latina 
.(E/CEPAL/DS/185, November 1978). . 
**/ Cf. R. Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capitalism", .CEPAL Review, 




and in the services where•its function is essentially to.mitigate the lack 
of job opportunities in the most;;nK> derni zed enterprises arid activities. 
With spurious absorption alternative-employment possibilities are opened 
vtp -for-.the. middle sectors,, although they, ar̂ ..partly• divorced from the real 
growth needs of;jthe economy. The pauses producing-them are obviously and 
fundamentally of a. so ci al r and political, nature. 
Thes.e facts reveal the structural m.aladjustments, and inconsistencies 
to be found in'the social and economic bases of . t i j e new ijiiddle séctors,.,. 
whose upwards trend was rather, arisen out of t h e i r be,tter education, high 
level of ..social .organization, Rapacity for political .pressure, and the , 
paradigmatic force of their patterns of consumption and performance, and 
less from their innovative and...driving participation,,in. economic production. 
,A number of authors have stressed the different historical role which these 
middle sectors are now playing compared with the. typical behaviour of the 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie qf the original period of capitalism. 
; For these reasons there have been no lack of analyses which.have 
cast doubts precisely on.. the economic efficiency gf a part^ of, these new ( 
sectors.® particularly. those .linked to the,bureaucracies and services, , 
reproaching them for possible parasitism .to the detriment of the 
possibilities of other less favoured sectors.. Althoygh it is ^ifficult 
if-not impossible to make an empirical justification of a judgment of 
this nature, the fact that tlie majority of these emerging middle groups 
have, located themselves in tertiary occupations, i.e., are not directly . 
related to the production of goods, does not fail to be .significant. In 
a great many .cases their participation in production is mainly constituted 
by the provision of personal .services which constitute, a final good, and 
frequently luxury consumption. ^ 
There seems to be no doubt that a .substantial part of the middle 
sectors, have benefited from the prevailing development styles,t either 
because their incomes have improved more than proportionally with respect 
to other lower social strata and because they participate to ap increasing 
extent.in the consumption. ,pf durables,;- or because .they have extracted the 
maximum advantages from the public services and means' of aàèistance and 
from the growth of secondary and higher education.11 '. 
/The possible 
The possible consequences., which, may be drawn from these processes 
are apparently ambiguous if not actually contradictory. In order to attempt 
an interpretation,of their significance it would be necessary to differentiate 
between two major segments on the basis of their orientation towards the 
social order in force. On the one hand are to be found the upper middle 
sectors favoured by present development styles and characterized by 
possessing conformist and adaptable attitudes, with, a high degree of 
immobility in their ideas.and inertia with respect to social changes. It 
has cost them a considerable effort to succeed in entering the consumer 
society, in which the majority of their members have a limited share, but 
the life .style of which they have resolutely assimilated. Many things have 
changed in their personal habits and social motivations showing the ; 
conviction with, which :they have adapted these new modes of social .existence. 
This segment forms a solid social and political block which upholds the 
continuity of the status quo. At the other end of the scale are,to be 
found some new middle sector contingents which have,not been rapidly and 
advantageously incorporated and co-opted by the system. This means that 
it cannot be ignored that attitudes tinged with resentment and possibly 
loaded with a potential for contesting and rejecting the development , 
strategies in force in their countries may possibly develop. This is to 
some extent the case of some of the educated youth who are haying 
increasing difficulties in gaining,a satisfactory foothold in the 
occupational structure. There is already an increasing number of graduates 
from the secondary and higher levels of. the educational system who do not 
find jobs in keeping with their training and aspirations,. Still worse, 
many of them may remain unemployed for a long period until they obtain 
some kind of work, frequently socially inferior to their education. This 
is more than a supposition, being a fact which is increasingly evident, 
since as from, the 1960s, at least the. rate of growth of secondary and higher 
education has been, increasing three.or four times faster than the labour 
force as a whole., i.e., in any case the supply of. educationally qualified 
young people is increasing much more rapidly, than the growth trend of 
occupations of an equivalent standing, 
/As has 
' As has already*:been said, it would.not be possible to estimate,with 
any'reasonable! approximation•to accuracy the real rate of. growth of. 
' occupations in the'middle and upper strata-which necessarily „stem from the 
growth of the economy and which are not therefore the result of .diverse 
social-pressures'which strive to esq)and employment, possibilities for these 
sectors. This observation is based on a relatively well known fact which 
indicates'that in the ¿'majority of the, Latin.; American countries a , . 
considerable hypertrophy of personnel eitployed in public bureaucracy and 
in the technical and professional services may be seen which is not in 
proportion to their degree of-economic development. 
i- There is often a tendency to generalize the phenomenon, of. spurious,. 
absorption referred' to' above, with a whole-.s^uel of effects of a. different 
tendency, according to ¡the frame of.reference in which they are interpreted. 
The positive significance'should be noted of the growth of broad dependent 
middle strata, with higher levels.of education, generated by the growing 
bureaucratization of countries undergoing a rapid process.of modernization, 
and which, When added to"those engendered by the growth of industry, trade 
and the services, have contributed to the formation of a .solid social block. 
On the other hand, some other consequences .pf consideration with a hint of 
the problematical can be observed. .The first is the existence already noted 
of an emerging "educated proletariat", structurally contradictory,. with 
high social and economic aspirations, partially unemployed or., underemployed, 
dissatisfied if not openly >frustrated, who n>ay in the circumstances be 
capable of engendering strong social and political resentment which 
marginates them from the system. Another consequence, naturally linked 
to the foregoing is the-"brain, drain", the eipigration of professionals, . 
scientists and technicians: towards other countries..where the professional 
market is more-favourable' to them. . If in.addition to all .this is added 
last of all ithe need-mobilizing impact of conpercial propaganda and the 
mass media, which disseminate life styles .and patterns, of international , 
prestige which attract-like • "a "demonstration effect",, an approximate 
picture of the de'grees of .-openj-qr .latent frustration .which are. being 
generated in these expectant middle sectors* can be obtained., 
/In the 
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In the framework of this ambiguous situation alliances have been 
created in which the rising middle sectors have conquered ,a considerable 
degree of access to State power. Their substantial weight in the process 
of modernization has taken the form of a generalized emergence of dominant 
"mesocratic" coalitions.*/ - Various aspects characterize these pew forms 
of domination. One of these is the growing appropriation of the flow of 
income generated by the econony, which the middle sectors obtain by using 
their greater social and political power and use to improve their relative 
participation in income at the expense of the poorest9 and sometimes of 
the richest sectors.**/ A second aspect which should be rapidly, noted is 
the tendency towards the educational.meritocratization of access to the 
middle-and upper occupational-positions of the State bureaucracy, and also 
of the entrepreneurial and professional strata of the modern enterprises., 
trade and private sector services. This presupposes greater importance of 
machinery of social selection and prestige favouring the middle sectors 
and based on criteria of bureaucratic rationality, i.e., on the educational 
diplomas and professional experience which,become essential. In fact they 
are so because they open the way to access to markets and recruitment 
processes for jobs which are reserved for persons who comply- with the 
requisite of possessing the minimum educational credentials required in 
terms of level and specialization. Lastly, the greater social and political 
weight of the middle sectors in the main decision-making centres and . 
particularly in the State technical administration material.! o in the 
development strategies and political styles which have proliferated in 
recent years,. There is no doubt that their importance is.such that they 
are contributing very significantly to forming the, present profile of the 
great majority of Latin American societies. 
In this framework of rapid and deep-rooted demographic, economic and 
social changes in the prevailing development styles, everything leads to 
the assumption that the demands for greater educational opportunities will 
tend to grow almost exponentially. The obtaining of educational credentials 
jty Cf, Jorge Graciarena, "Types of income concentration and political 
styles in Latin America", CEPAL Review, second semester 1976, N° 2, 
p. 210. 
th/ Ibidem,, p, 218 et seq, 
/will, even 
will, even more "than now, give â' possibility of access • to. the hierârchized 
labour markets according to the criteria òf meritocratic prestige based't» 
a large extent óh the achievements of increasing lengthy schooling. It can 
also be assumed that the same general trends towards social modérnization 
will carry weight in the sense of increasing the;,internal differentiation 
of the èducatiònal systems by hierarchizing them and making,;them, more 
selective in terms of social rather than strictly educational'.criteria, 
although this distinction'Tis difficult to'justify-in view, of-.the growing; 
interpénétration of the -fcwo criteria. In other terms, it is suggested that 
the career of<those who oêcupy-the highest executive and professional posts 
will increasingly 'depend on their educational career, -in which' their., 
successive achievements will be measured-from kindergarten.-ta-pos.t-gpaduate 
stage', and not "only according to the educational performanceofeach-, 
candidate but also in terms of-the academic prestige of the institutions-: 
of learning in Which he has- studied. That this is: more than just a , 
hypothesis is revealed by the satiation of several' countries of , the. region 
where it is possible to seé clearly the path of the -upward-amoving educational 
channels' which' quasi-rnonopolize- access the labour markets for-,positions 
and careers at the occupational summit.1 Although.-this ̂connexion between, 
educational institutions and'gli te positions is of long standing in some, 
of these countries, it does, however, seem indubitable that even dn these 
countries social pressures increase continuously without producing the . 
democratization of education and^society desired. These elitist trends 
in education coexist in a number of countries with ari educational system 
for the masses which lacks resources and-capacity for tackling.the 
requirements of elementary literacy arid'learning âmûng the -great national 
majorities. 
